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ABSTRACT. This Note explores the legal responsibilities that local governments have toward
marginalized communities in a time of crisis and argues that people with disabilities (PWDs)
have a "right to be rescued": a legal right to have their unique needs accounted for and addressed
in emergency planning. Exploring a series of cases that have established this right, the Note fo-
cuses on an innovative class action lawsuit in which the court held that the City of New York
failed to ensure that PWDs have meaningful access to the City's emergency services. As the na-
tion continues to rebuild after Sandy and faces a future in which disasters will become the norm,
this Note argues that the story of this case and the man-made disaster that surrounded it should
serve as a call to action for other urban areas that have yet to adequately plan for the needs of
PWDs in emergencies. Such planning is not merely morally correct; it is legally required, and it
is critical that local governments get their plans in order before the next storms, and lawsuits,
come.
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INTRODUCTION
We are living in an age of disaster. Since 198o, the United States has sus-
tained 178 weather and climate disasters in which overall damages reached or
exceeded one billion dollars.1 The United States experienced eight such disas-
ters in 2014 alone, including tornados, hurricanes, post-tropical cyclones,
droughts, wildfires, and other severe weather events.2 As startling as these fig-
ures are, they are likely to get worse in the years ahead; the risk of disasters is
on the rise. From 2000 through 2009, there were three times as many natural
disasters as there were from 198o through 1989; climate-related disasters ac-
counted for about eighty percent of this increase.3 The impact of these disasters
will continue to increase as population and economic resources become increas-
ingly concentrated, and increasingly concentrated within areas that are dispro-
portionately vulnerable to disasters,4 including coastal cities.
As communities face more and more climate-related challenges, they will
face more moral ones as well. Although it is tempting to think of weather and
climate incidents as "natural" disasters, that is a misnomer; nearly all "natural"
disasters arise in part from human error or oversight.' More fundamentally, the
choices we make about where to live, how to live, and how to build put us at
risk for disasters. In this way, disasters are socially constructed. How we
choose to respond to the urgent human needs that arise from large-scale
weather events determines the degree to which these events become "disas-
ters." As disasters become more frequent, social inequalities will be thrown into
sharper relief, and the consequences of such inequalities will become increas-
ingly dire. Communities will be forced to grapple with two essential questions:
in preparing for disasters, how "ready" is ready enough, and to what degree
should identity and social status determine who is put in danger, left in misery,
and left to die?
This Note explores the legal responsibilities of local governments toward
marginalized communities in a time of crisis and argues that people with disa-
bilities (PWDs) have a "right to be rescued": a legal right to have their unique
needs accounted for and addressed in emergency planning. Exploring a series
1. Nat'l Climatic Data Ctr., Billion-Dollar Weather/Climate Disasters: Overview, NAT'L OCEANIC
& ATMOSPHERiC ADMIN. http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/overview [http://perma.cc
/W56Y-CVM 9 ].
2. Id.
3. Jennifer Leaning & Debarati Guha-Sapir, Natural Disasters, Armed Conflict, and Public
Health, 369 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1836, 1836 (2013).
4. DANIELA. FARBERET AL., DISASTER LAwAND POLICY 23 (2d ed. 2009).
5. Id. at 3.
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of cases that established this right, I focus on an innovative class action lawsuit
in which the court found that the City of New York failed to ensure that PWDs
have meaningful access to the City's emergency services. In Part I, I examine
the moral challenges inherent in disaster planning for PWDs, arguing that the
tendency to under-plan for the needs of PWDs during periods of disaster stems
both from a general misunderstanding of their unique needs and from a tacit
acceptance of the notion that emergency planning requires prioritizing some
lives over others. In Part II, I explain how the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act create a framework for disability rights liti-
gation, but leave open the question of the extent to which government actors
and private entities must plan for the evacuation of and communication with
PWDs in times of emergency. I explore the small handful of cases that have
addressed this issue to date, providing the context in which the case against the
City of New York ultimately arose. In Part III, I discuss the origins of that case,
Brooklyn Center for Independence of the Disabled (BCID) v. Bloomberg, and de-
scribe the parties' disagreements about what constitutes harm. In Part IV, I de-
tail the dramatic intervention of Hurricane Sandy mere days before the class
was certified, and I explore the effect of the storm on the trial. In Part V, I dis-
cuss the ruling in the case, the stipulation of settlement, and its significance in
helping to strengthen the legal foundation of the right to be rescued. Finally, in
Part VI, I discuss the significance and promise of the BCID ruling and the prin-
ciples that should guide emergency planning for PWDs in light of recent litiga-
tion and other considerations. In particular, I argue that cities should consult
with PWDs and outside experts to create detailed plans that anticipate and
clearly address the needs of PWDs in emergencies, and that cities should clear-
ly communicate the range of available services to provide PWDs with the op-
portunity to plan for their own needs.
As New York rebuilds after Hurricane Sandy, the nation faces a future in
which disasters will become the norm. This Note argues that the story of BCID
v. Bloomberg and the man-made disaster that surrounded it should serve as a
call to action for other urban areas that have yet to adequately plan for the
needs of PWDs in emergencies. Adequate planning for the needs of PWDs
during disasters is not merely morally correct; it is legally required, and it is
critical that local governments get their plans in order before the next storms,
and lawsuits, come.
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I. THE MORAL CHALLENGES OF DISASTER PLANNING FOR PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES
Almost one in five people in the United States has a disability, and of those,
more than half report having severe disabilities.6 Despite this reality and de-
spite legal protections that are meant to ensure reasonably equal access to
PVDs, many programs, services, public facilities, and private establishments
remain inaccessible to PWDs and are not planned with the needs of PWDs in
mind.' Similarly, although large-scale disasters occur with relative frequency,
few people invest significant mental energy into planning ahead for catastro-
phes or regard the possible occurrence of an extreme weather event as a part of
everyday life. As a result, planning for the needs of PWDs in a time of disaster
requires thinking along two axes that are out of the ordinary and present many
unique challenges - both moral and legal.
As this nation's experiences during Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Sandy,
and other disasters have made clear, extreme weather events and other emer-
gencies do not impact all populations equally. It is uncomfortable to recognize
our collective role in apportioning the burdens of calamitous events; indeed,
"natural" disasters are so called because "it suits some people to explain them
that way. As 'natural' events, disasters are nobody's fault."8 But "risk and vul-
nerability are not indiscriminately distributed in disasters, nor are preexisting
systems of stratification eliminated";9 instead, disasters frequently exacerbate
forms of social marginalization that existed all along.'" For instance, people
who are poor are less likely to have ready access to cash and private vehicles to
evacuate in a disaster." Where poor people are concentrated in a neighbor-
6. Matthew W. Brault, Americans with Disabilities: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), http://
www.census.gov/prod/2o12pubs/p 7o-1 31.pdf [http://perma.cc/M 7 GR-BB2 3].
7. See, e.g., Kelly Johnson, Testers Standing Up for Title III of the ADA, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
683, 684 (2009) (noting that " [t]he disabled population hoped that, as a result of the ADA,
their lives would no longer be shaped by limited access and the inability to choose. Howev-
er, reality - a lack of compliance with the ADA and severe underenforcement of the statute -
soon destroyed this hope").
8. Greg Bankoff, No Such Thing as Natural Disasters, HARv. INT'L REV.: BLOG (Aug. 23, 2010),
http ://hir.harvard.edu/no-such-thing-as-natural-disasters [http://perma.cc/AE5 M-C8AW].
9. Susan Gooden et al., Social Equity in Local Emergency Management Planning, 41 ST. & Loc.
GOV'T REv. 1, (2009).
1o. Id. at 2.
11. For example, surveys of New Orleans residents evacuated in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina revealed that "[c]ompared with New Orleans and Louisiana residents as a whole,
disproportionate numbers of the evacuees [who failed to leave in advance of the hurricane]
were African American [and] had low incomes and low rates of home ownership." Mollyann
Brodie et al., Experience of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees in Houston Shelters: Implications for Fu-
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hood, entire neighborhoods may be at great risk and face difficulty complying
with evacuation orders, as was the case in New Orleans during and after Hurri-
cane Katrina. 2
PWDs are particularly at risk during times of disaster as a result of various
impairments. Many PWDs, including those who are blind, deaf, or hard of
hearing, may have difficulty accessing the information they need to escape safe-
ly.13 Those with mobility issues may be unable to exit their homes and make
their way to safe shelter without dedicated assistance and accessible transporta-
tion options-an everyday challenge that can quickly become deadly.' Sadly,
"[i]t is no surprise that people with disabilities are often overlooked or given
short shrift when ... emergencies arise. In the best of circumstances, challeng-
es facing this group may be invisible because they arise out of the implicit as-
sumptions and institutional arrangements that form the backdrop of daily
life.""
ture Planning, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1402, 1402 (2oO6); see also Nicole M. Stephens et al.,
Why Did They 'Choose' To Stay? Perspectives of Hurricane Katrina Observers and Survivors, 20
PSYCHOL. Sci. 878, 879 (2009) (summarizing studies of Hurricane Katrina evacuees finding
that "leavers" who evacuated prior to Katrina lived in primarily middle-class white contexts,
had more education and income, and had more reliable transportation than "stayers," who
lived in primarily working-class black contexts). In addition, those who reported that they
could not have found a way to leave before the hurricane hit had lower incomes on average
than those who reported that they could have evacuated. Stephens et al., supra.
12. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many news outlets focused on the disproportionate
impact of the storm on residents of poor neighborhoods well known to be vulnerable to
flooding. As the New York Times noted, "[i]n the Lower Ninth Ward neighborhood, which
was inundated by the floodwaters, more than 98 percent of the residents are black and more
than a third live in poverty." David Gonzalez, From Margins of Society to Center of the Tragedy,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.nytimes.con/2oos/o9/o2/nationa/nationalspecial
/o2discrim.html [http://perma.cc/R298-36RF]; see also Byron Calame, Editorial, Covering
New Orleans: The Decade Before the Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, http://www.nytimes
.com/2oo 5/o 9/11/opinion/ilpubliceditor.html [http://perma.cc/XM72-QA3K] (noting that
many poor residents of New Orleans lacked cars with which to evacuate and lived in low-
lying areas where the flooding was the swiftest and highest).
13. See, e.g., Civil Rights Div., Americans with Disabilities Act: An ADA Guide for Local Govern-
ments, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (Oct. 9, 2oo8), http://www.ada.gov/emergencyprepguide.htm
[http://perma.cc/M369-WDEY] ("Many traditional emergency notification methods are
not accessible to or usable by people with disabilities. People who are deaf or hard of hearing
cannot hear radio, television, sirens, or other audible alerts. Those who are blind or who
have low vision may not be aware of visual cues, such as flashing lights.").
14. See Disaster Readiness Tips for People With Mobility Disabilities, NAT'L ORG. ON DISABILUTY
(Sept. 2009), http://nod.org/assets/downloads/Readiness-Tips-Mobility-Disabilities.pdf
[http://perma.cc/JC4N-XPL4].
is. Wendy F. Hensel & Leslie E. Wolf, Playing God: The Legality of Plans Denying Scarce Re-
sources to People with Disabilities in Public Health Emergencies, 63 FLA. L. REV. 719, 720-21
(2011) (footnote omitted).
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The failure to plan for the needs of the most at-risk populations during pe-
riods of disaster may also be rooted in the rationale that emergencies require us
to prioritize the needs of some at the expense of others. As one scholar has not-
ed,
[T]he principle of utility might translate into a policy of attempting to
save the greatest number of lives and thus to direct treatment to those
who are most likely to benefit from it .... Utilitarian principles might
militate against prioritizing care for the disadvantaged in an emergency
if such individuals would require a disproportionate amount of re-
sources.
16
Arrested for murder after actively hastening the deaths of patients at the
Memorial Medical Center in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, one phy-
sician went on to argue "for changing the standards of medical care in emer-
gencies," reportedly contending, "that doctors need to be able to evacuate the
sickest or most severely injured patients last." 7 Although many PWDs
are healthy people who live independently, emergency management and disas-
ter responders often incorrectly equate disability with illness and do not see the
need to plan for PWDs as part of the general population during times of emer-
gency. 8 Indeed, in many instances, officials may not see the need to plan for
PWDs at all, as the BCID plaintiffs argued in their suit against the City of New
York. 9 As one expert on the needs of PWDs during disasters explains, "People
with disabilities are thought of as almost, but not quite, human. [The attitude
16. Sharona Hoffman, Preparing for Disaster: Protecting the Most Vulnerable in Emergencies, 42
U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1491, 15o8-o9 (2009).
17. Sheri Fink, The Deadly Choices at Memorial, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 25, 2009, http://www
.nytimes.com/2oo9/o8/3o/magazine/3odoctors.html [http://perma.cc/P724-LEPM] (de-
scribing the physician's position).
18. Telephone Interview with Shari Myers, Executive Director, Portlight Strategies (Sept. 26,
2014). Portlight Strategies assists PWDs through post-disaster relief projects and responds
to catastrophic events as they unfold. About Portlight, PORTLIGHT.ORG, http://www
.portlight.org/about.html [http://perma.cc/L8SE-288J]. In the wake of Hurricane Sandy,
Portlight served as the fiscal sponsor for People's Relief, the largest post-disaster grassroots
canvassing effort in Coney Island, of which I was a co-founder and lead organizer. See Ami-
ty Paye, City, NYCHA Door-to-Door Campaigns Late or Non-Existent After Hurricane Sandy,
N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Nov. 21, 2012, http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2ol2/nov/21/citys
-nycha-door-to-door-campaigns-late-or-non [http://perma.cc/GE3K- 5 YXU] (describing
my role as an organizer of People's Relief).
ig. Class Action Complaint for Discrimination; Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at i, Brooklyn
Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg (BCID), 287 F.R.D. 24o (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 26, 2011) (No. ii Civ. 6690) [hereinafter Class Action Complaint].
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of emergency responders is:] 'We're doing all we can do to help the real peo-
ple, and we don't have any resources left to help the half people."'.
Few people would argue directly that PWDs deserve less assistance during
times of disaster. But the systemic exclusion of PWDs from disaster plans,
coupled with arguments that it may be impossible to meet the needs of all peo-
ple during times of disaster, suggests a widespread, if tacit, endorsement of the
notion that it is fine to value lives differently when push comes to shove. Due
to widespread prejudice, "[h]istorically, even those with moderately limiting
disabilities have been viewed with pity and discomfort rather than as fully
functioning human beings worth 'saving."'' Such beliefs have already influ-
enced a variety of emergency policies and raised the death tolls of PWDs dur-
ing disastrous events.' During Hurricane Katrina, for instance, "[t]he infirm
elderly, poor, and disabled were the most likely to die."23 Despite the known
vulnerabilities of PWDs and other marginalized groups, one study found that
fewer than a quarter of the emergency operation plans of numerous county and
city governments across the United States address in depth the needs of the
most vulnerable population groups. 4
Emergency planning for PWDs tests the limits of our commitment to
equality and what we imagine to be possible in times of distress. If one starts
from the presumption that it is impossible to meet the needs of all people in
the event of an emergency, the drive to prioritize the needs of the non-disabled,
the healthy, and those most able to survive without any assistance will consist-
ently invite discrimination against PWDs and other vulnerable groups. How-
ever, while emergencies present unique challenges, they do not require us to
accept a reality in which we know in advance that our plans may be inadequate
and can foresee with certainty the groups that are most likely to suffer when
the outer limits of our capacity are tested. The either-or choice between helping
more people with disabilities and helping more people without disabilities is a
20. Telephone Interview with Shari Myers, supra note 18.
21. Hensel & Wolf, supra note 15, at 722-23 (discussing protocols adopted during the swine flu
pandemic that systematically excluded people with disabilities from treatment, even where
the nature of their disabilities had no bearing on the likely success of the medical interven-
tion in question).
22. See Lessons Learned from the World Trade Center Disaster: Emergency Preparedness for People
with Disabilities in New York, CENTER FOR INDEPENDENCE DISABLED, N.Y. (2004), http://
www.nobodyleftbehind2.org/resources/pdf/lessons-learnedfrom-the-worldtrade-center
_disaster.pdf [http://perma.cc/VS7T-ZKSW].
23. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 1494 (citing Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut:
Tax Policy as the Handmaiden of Budget Policy, 41 GA. L. REv. 503, 558-59 (2007) (asserting
that over seventy-five percent of those who died in Katrina were over sixty years old)).
24. Gooden et al., supra note 9, at 4-5, 8 & tbl.2 (study based on data from thirty-one localities).
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false one. Instead, we must decide whether to accept a scarcity of accessible
emergency services and extend the widespread discrimination against PWDs to
matters of life and death, or whether to increase our capacity to deal with disas-
ter to the point that our plans meet the needs of all who require assistance.
Challenges to the adequacy of emergency plans for PWDs to some extent re-
quire us to believe that there cannot be - and must not be - any emergency that
exceeds our capacity to meet the needs of even the most vulnerable. Rather
than accept as inevitable that some people will be left behind, we must signifi-
cantly increase our overall level of commitment to managing emergency events.
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, THE REHABILITATION
ACT, AND THE RIGHT TO BE RESCUED
In recent years, PWDs and their advocates have begun to craft arguments
that more effective emergency planning for PVDs is not only morally neces-
sary, but legally mandated. Drawing on the robust protections provided by the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), these cases have created a legal framework for the right to be rescued,
establishing that emergency services must be provided on an equal basis to dis-
abled and non-disabled people.
A. Statutory Framework for Legal Challenges to Emergency Plans for PWDs
Emergency planning for PWDs presents challenging legal questions be-
cause it poses an extreme test of the meaning of accessibility. The RA and the
ADA are the two main federal statutes that aim to prevent discrimination
against PWDs. Together, they establish that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public enti-
ty, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."'2 The RA came into
effect first, but it applied only to programs receiving federal assistance.26 Hop-
ing to combat persistent forms of discrimination not reached by the RA and to
provide courts with a more robust antidiscrimination framework 7 that would
25. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. II, § 202, 104 Stat. 337 (1990) (cod-
ified at 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2010)); see also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, tit.
V, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2010)) (establishing similar
guidelines for federally funded programs).
26. Deborah Leuchovius & Rachel Parker, ADA Q&A: The Rehabilitation Act and ADA Connec-
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apply to state and local governments, Congress went on to pass the ADA, issu-
ing "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities. Today, despite the "subtle
differences between these disability acts, the standards adopted by Title II of
the ADA for state and local government services are generally [regarded as be-
ing] the same as those required under § 504 of [the RA for] federally assisted
programs and activities." 9
Title II and § 504 "are commonly referred to as 'program access' obliga-
tions,"3" and together, they establish broad, comprehensive protections for
PWDs in the provision of government services and programs. The ADA im-
plementing regulations state that each "public entity shall operate each service,
program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its
entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities."31 In
Alexander v. Choate, a seminal case on discrimination against PWDs, the Su-
preme Court interpreted 5 504 as requiring that PWDs
be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers.
The benefit itself, of course, cannot be defined in a way that effectively
denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful ac-
cess to which they are entitled; to assure meaningful access, reasonable
accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit may have to be
made."
The Alexander holding suggested that courts should regard as "reasonable" re-
quested modifications that concretely benefit PWDs without compromising
the "essential nature" of the programs in question.33 These same "meaningful
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
29. Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Henrietta D. v. Giulia-
ni, 119 F. Supp. 2d 181, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)).
30. Laurence Paradis, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act: Making Programs, Services, and Activities Accessible to All, 14 STAN. L. & PoL'Y RtEV.
389, 391 (2003).
31. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (addressing nondiscrimination on the basis of disability in state and
local government services).
32. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (emphases added).
33. Id. at 299-300 (discussing Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), the Court's previ-
ous major attempt to define the scope of § 504, in which it held that a college was not re-
quired to admit to its nursing program a plaintiff with a major hearing disability because the
plaintiff was unlikely to derive benefit from the modifications required by regulation and
further suggested that modifications would have compromised the "essential nature" of the
nursing program).
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access" and "reasonable accommodation" standards were subsequently held to
apply to both Title II and § 504.34
Significantly, both Acts are designed to address both intentional and unin-
tentional discrimination. As the Court noted in Alexander, "[d]iscrimination
against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most often the prod-
uct, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-
of benign neglect."3 Likewise, the ADA recognizes that discrimination against
PWDs could be either overt and deliberate, or pervasive in its effect, and the
ADA was designed to combat both "outright intentional exclusion" and "the
discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication bar-
riers,... failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices,...
and relegation to lesser services, programs, [and] activities. ' 6
Facing program access litigation based on Title II and § 504, courts strug-
gle to determine the point at which disparate impact may give rise to a finding
of impermissible discrimination. In applying the "meaningful access" standard
established by these two Acts, courts have acknowledged "two powerful but
countervailing considerations -the need to give effect to the statutory objec-
tives and the desire to keep [the Acts] within manageable bounds."37 "The Su-
preme Court has explicitly rejected the position that all conduct that [has] a
disparate impact on disabled persons"' 8 constitutes impermissible discrimina-
tion, and has instead found that "[t]he 'meaningful access' standard [strikes] a
balance"39 between the competing priorities that must govern consideration of
such claims. Courts have held that although the entities governed by the ADA
and RA "need not be required to make 'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifica-
tions to accommodate the handicapped, [they] may be required to make 'rea-
sonable' ones." 4' The Alexander decision suggested several criteria to assess
whether meaningful access has been provided, including the lack of tests with a
particularly exclusionary effect on PWDs, 4' an absence of reliance on traits that
34. See, e.g., Disabled in Action v. Bd. of Elections, 752 F. 3d 189, 203 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing
the "meaningful access" standard established by Title II and § 504 and citing Alexander, 469
U.S. at 299).
35. 469 U.S. at 295.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 121o1(a)(5) (2012).
37. Disabled inAction, 752 F.3d at 203 (citing Alexander, 469 U.S. at 299).
38. Civic Ass'n of the Deaf of N.Y.C. v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 8591, 2011 WL 5995182,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011).
39. Id. (citing Alexander, 469 U.S. at 299).
40. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300 (quoting Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979)).
41. Id. at 302 (finding that the challenged program "does not invoke criteria that have a particu-
lar exclusionary effect on the handicapped").
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PWDs as a group are less likely to have,' and "evenhanded treatment"43 of
PWDs such that both disabled and non-disabled people have "identical and ef-
fective . . . services fully available for their use."'  However, which program
modifications are "fundamental" and which are "reasonable" is largely in the
eye of the beholder. Courts have interpreted the standards of the ADA and the
RA "in varying ways, sometimes requiring substantial efforts to provide access
and sometimes accepting only de minimis efforts."4" Where some courts "have
concluded that the meaningful access standard requires actual equality of op-
portunity, ' '46 others have explicitly rejected the idea that the ADA and RA re-
quire equal results, 47 instead using "a minimalist application of the meaningful
access standard."
48
As difficult as it can be to determine what the ADA and RA require under
ordinary circumstances, the challenge is all the greater during times of emer-
gency. Disaster plans are virtually always insufficient to account for all the
problems that may arise, and because disasters arise relatively infrequently, the
set of programs and services that constitute a city's response to disaster will be
tested only rarely. Put another way, when the factual circumstances are inher-
ently unreasonable, it may be difficult for judges and policymakers to imagine
what "reasonable accommodations" require. Similarly, when many non-
disabled people have been ill-served by inadequate disaster plans, courts may
find it hard to determine whether services provided to PW-Ds were significantly
worse. Judges may feel ill-equipped to determine whether the "auxiliary aids
and services . . . afford[ed to] individuals with disabilities" were, as federal
regulations require, "appropriate" and sufficient to grant PWDs "an equal op-
portunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of," emergency services.
49
However, as impossible as these questions may seem, it is vital that local gov-
ernments strive to answer them; indeed, the law demands that they do so. The
legislative history of the ADA indicates Congress's express intent to ensure that
42. Id.
43. Id. at 304.
44. Id. at 302.
45. Paradis, supra note 30, at 399.
46. Id. at 400 (discussing the range of interpretations of the "meaningful access" standard).
47. See, e.g., Civic Ass'n of the Deaf of N.Y.C., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8591, 201l WL 5995182, at *1o
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011) ("Case law stresses that the ADA and RA do not require equal re-
sults.").
48. Paradis, supra note 30, at 400.
49. 28 C.F.R. 5 35.i6o(b)(1) (2011).
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emergency services be accessible to PWDs, s° for "when life and death are at
stake even minor differences in programs can have catastrophic consequences
to the recipients." 1
B. What Do the ADA and RA Require in an Emergency?
1. Cases Challenging the Practices of Private Entities or Individual Agencies
Only a small handful of cases have addressed issues relating to the accessi-
bility of emergency services. Cases challenging the practices of specific agencies
and entities fall into two main types: those that address the ability of PWDs to
contact and communicate with emergency services, and those that address
evacuation of PWDs during emergencies. Collectively, these cases establish
that the emergency response plans of public agencies and private entities must
specifically account for the needs of PWDs. These suits have resulted in signifi-
cant reforms within entities whose practices have been challenged. However,
because the cases within this universe have focused on the inadequate plans of
discrete agencies and parties, the broader framework of public disaster re-
sponse services for PWDs- and the systemic failures within that structure -
has remained largely untouched.
In one case focused on communication issues, the City of New York was
enjoined from removing street alarm boxes that provided deaf individuals with
an effective, accessible means of directly reporting emergencies to 911 from the
street.s2 The court found that public telephones would not enable deaf individ-
uals to report the location and type of an emergency, and that the defendants'
proposed removal of the street boxes would violate the ADA and RA." The
City sought to have the injunction lifted fifteen years later, arguing that its
adoption of a "tapping" protocol for, public telephones enabled deaf and hear-
ing impaired people to use such phones to indicate and distinguish their need
so. The final House conference report issued before the passage of the ADA describes Title II as
having been designed to ensure, among other things, that 911 emergency lines would be ac-
cessible to people with hearing and vision impairments. The report notes that "[w]ith this
[T]itle II mandate, individuals with hearing and speech impairments will finally join the
rest of us in having immediate access to assistance from police, fire, and ambulance ser-
vices." H.R. REP. No. 101-596, at 68 (199o) (Conf. Rep.).
Si. William C. Hollis III, Rights of People with Disabilities to Emergency Evacuation Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 199o, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 524, 540 (2002).
S2. Civic Ass'n of the Deaf of New York City, Inc. v. Giuliani, 915 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
S3. Id. at 639.
2418
124:24o6 2015
THE RIGHT TO BE RESCUED
for police or fire services,' thus eliminating the need for separate street alarm
boxes. The City argued that its new practices constituted changed circumstanc-
es warranting the vacation or removal of the injunction, but the court rejected
this argument,55 finding the City's new measures to be insufficient to meet the
needs of PWDs. 6
In another case focused on communications access, a Texas court consid-
ered a suit brought by a deaf woman who contacted emergency services to help
her ailing boyfriend.' She was not provided with effective, appropriate Ameri-
can Sign Language interpretation services during her encounter with the police
and emergency responders, even though she had conveyed her need for inter-
pretive services when she contacted 911.58 The court found that it was unclear
whether the City's duty to provide emergency services extended to people such
as the plaintiff who were not themselves in peril.59 However, "once the emer-
gency responders make an effort to communicate with and extract information
from such a person, the public entity has a duty, under the ADA, to ensure that
a disabled person is afforded an equal opportunity to benefits from the services
provided. ", 6° Emphasizing that "the ability to effectively communicate includes
not only the act of receiving, but also the act of imparting information," the
court found that even if the police had received information adequate to com-
plete their investigation, that receipt did not address whether the plaintiff had
been able to adequately communicate with police officers. 6' Just as in the case
against the City of New York, the judge concluded that PWDs must be granted
the same opportunity as non-disabled individuals to contact and converse with
emergency responders. 6'
Another line of cases has addressed the right of disabled people to be evac-
uated during an emergency. These cases have emphasized the importance of
54. Civic Ass'n of the Deaf of New York City, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 8591, 2011
WL 5995182, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011) (explaining that the tapping protocol al-
lowed deaf or hearing impaired users to "specify through repeated two-taps or single taps
on the receiver whether they need fire or police assistance, respectively," using the buttons
available on the public telephone box).
5S. Id. at *11.
56. Id. at *13 (finding that "the factual circumstances in this case have not changed sufficiently
to merit withdrawal of the injunction").
57. Salinas v. City of New Braunfels, 557 F. Supp. 2d 777 (W.D. Tex. 20o8).
58. Id. at 778-79.
59. Id. at 782.
60. Id. (citing Falls v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., No. Civ.A. 97-1545, 1999 WL 33485550, at *8
(D. Md. Mar. 16, 1999)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
61. Id. at 785.
62. Id.
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developing formal policies that address the unique needs of PWDs during cata-
strophic events and have required the defendants in question to develop proto-
cols to ensure that PWDs can be safely evacuated in the event of an emergency.
In one case, disabled students at the University of California, Berkeley filed
a civil class action lawsuit against the University that challenged on-campus
physical access barriers.6 3 After a protracted litigation process, the parties
reached an arbitrated settlement, and as part of that settlement, the University
agreed to adopt a number of building evacuation measures for PWDs.
6 4
Among other terms, the University agreed to adopt formal evacuation policies
and procedures for the safe evacuation of PWDs, to provide signage and maps
in each building indicating safe evacuation routes for PWDs, to provide evacu-
ation chairs to assist with the evacuation of people with mobility impairments,
and to train faculty members and employees on how to assist PWDs in the
event of an emergency. 6' Taken together, the policies help ensure that non-
disabled people at the University are aware of the needs of PWDs in an emer-
gency and that PWDs will not be left behind.
A similar suit against a Marshalls store in Silver Spring, Maryland 66 result-
ed in a settlement that required the store to create accessible evacuation plans
as a condition of its obligations under Title III of the ADA,6 7 which applies to
privately owned places of public accommodation and commercial facilities. 6
Prior to this suit, "there was not a clear answer to the question of whether Title
III of the ADA applied to emergency plans' '6' as "there had been no court rul-
ings specifying that companies are required to draw up evacuation plans with
disabled people in mind."7' The case was brought by a wheelchair user who
63. Joan E. Camara, ADA Compliance and Reasonable Accommodation in Crisis Management: A
Suggested Action Planfor Employers, 11 ALSB J. EMP. &LAB. L. 1,1o (2oo9).
64. Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims, Gustafson v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
No. C-97-4o16 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2004), http://www.dralegal.org/sites/dralegal.org/files
/casefiles/settlement_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q.9 8S-6HHOj [hereinafter Gustafson Settle-
ment].
6S. Id.
66. Savage v. City Place Ltd. P'ship, No. 2403o6, 2004 WL 3045404 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 20,
2004).
67. Nationwide Training Scheduled: Marshalls Agrees To Settle Emergency Evacuation Dispute, ADA
COMPLIANcE GUIDE NEWSL. (Thompson Media Grp., LLC, Washington, D.C.), July 2005.
68. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. 101-336, tit. III, § 302 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182 (2010)) (prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation).
69. John Grady & Damon P. S. Andrew, Equality of Access to Emergency Services for People with
Disabilities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17J. LEGALASPECTS SPORT 1, 5 (2007).
70. Id. (internal citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
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had been ordered to evacuate the Marshalls store after a fire alarm went off.7'
Like other customers, the plaintiff was directed to evacuate by exiting into the
mall, but
[a]s power to the mall escalator and elevator had been shut down,
there were no other useable mall exits. Savage, in a wheelchair, was es-
sentially trapped along with an elderly couple, a woman with a leg
brace, a man using two canes, an obese woman who said climbing stairs
made her breathless and a woman in a walker.... Neither the store nor
mall personnel provided assistance or guidance. They waited in the in-
terior mall area for approximately one hour, until an announcement
was made that the fire alarm was a false one. '
After the defendants' motion for summary judgment was denied, 3 the parties
began settlement negotiations and ultimately reached a settlement "that re-
quired Marshalls to provide accessible evacuation routes for disabled shoppers
in all of its 700 stores in 42 states and Puerto Rico."74
In another case, the Fourth Circuit held that the ADA and RA required
public entities to adopt policies to address the evacuation needs of PWDs in
emergencies, but did not mandate specific results.7 In that case, "a severely
mobility-impaired student was left alone in her middle school which had been
evacuated due to a bomb threat. After her parents complained, the school
board developed a plan that designated the middle school library as a 'safe area'
for disabled students."76 After the same student was left in this area during a
subsequent fire drill, her parents sued, alleging that the school board had failed
"to develop and implement effective procedures for the safe evacuation of disa-
bled children."' The court agreed that "the appropriate remedy would be in-
junctive relief requiring the School Board to develop and implement a reasona-
ble evacuation plan for disabled children," but found that no further relief
was warranted because the school board had already "developed and imple-
mented a reasonable emergency evacuation plan." 9 Critics of this decision
p. Savage, 2004 VL 3045404, at *1.
72. Camara, supra note 63, at 9.
73. Savage, 2004 WL 3045404, at *3.
74. Camara, supra note 63, at io.
75. Shirey ex rel. Kyger v. City of Alexandria Sch. Bd., 229 F. 3d 1143, 200 WL 1198054 (4 th Cir.
2000) (unpublished).
76. Camara, supra note 63, at 4.
T7. Shirey, 2000 WI 1198054, at *1.
78. Id. at *5.
79. Id.
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have noted that "the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals essentially equated actual
evacuation with evacuation procedures when it held that the ADA merely re-
quired access to safe evacuation procedures." 's By "mov[ing] from requiring
safe evacuation to access to safe evacuation procedures .... the Fourth Circuit
has interpreted the ADA and Rehabilitation Acts as not requiring that disabled
persons have equal access to actual safe evacuation during emergencies. " 8,
Nonetheless, the court's finding that the school was liable for discrimination
based on disability so long as it had "no reasonable plan in place to evacuate
disabled children from school buildings during an emergency "s2 was an im-
portant one. In the court's view, a general evacuation procedure did not satisfy
the ADA and RA; instead, only emergency procedures that specifically ac-
counted for the needs of PWDs would suffice s.8 Taken together, these cases es-
tablish that the ADA and RA require that emergency response plans accommo-
date the specific communication and evacuation needs of PWDs, and each case
represented an important victory for the specific plaintiffs in question and
PWDs more generally. However, each case was limited to addressing the acces-
sibility of specific emergency response tools or the protocols of one specific
agency or entity; none asked for broader systemic changes or fundamentally
altered the obligations of emergency responders as a whole during times of dis-
aster. In addition, several of the cases dealing with the rights of PWDs in
emergencies resulted in negotiated settlements;84 as a result, these cases left
open the question of what remedial obligations a defendant would incur if a
court found a disaster plan to be inadequate. Although these cases took steps
toward establishing a right to be rescued, they left many questions unan-
swered, and virtually all PWDs remained at risk, with few programs crafted to
meet their specific needs.
2. Structural Reform Litigation
Recognizing that the needs of PWDs during disasters far exceeded the
remedies that narrow cases could provide, the attorneys of Disability Rights
Advocates (DRA) sought to expand the right to be rescued through structural
reform litigation that went beyond individual agencies, campuses, or business-
es, and instead focused on the emergency plans of an entire city. DRA is one of
8o. Camara, supra note 63, at 4.
81. Hollis, supra note 51, at 541.
82. Shirey, 2000 WL 1198054, at *5.
83. See id. at *5-*6.
84. See, e.g., Verdict and Settlement Summary, Salinas v. City of New Braunfels, 2008 WL
2421973 (W.D. Tex. 20o8) (No. SA-o6-C-729 -XR); Gustafson Settlement, supra note 64.
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the leading non-profit disability rights legal centers in the nation, and it seeks
to remedy systemic problems through class action and other high-impact liti-
gation.8 ' Run by and for PWDs, DRA has achieved critical victories and se-
cured important legal precedents for PWDs on a broad spectrum of issues, im-
proving the lives of millions of people with a variety of disabilities. 6
In a lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles, DRA argued that the emergen-
cy plans of the City of Los Angeles failed to address the needs of PWDs. By
early 2011, DRA had received a landmark ruling in the case, in which the court
found that the City of Los Angeles violated the ADA and the RA by failing to
account for the needs of PWDs in planning for disasters.8 Unlike previous rul-
ings that addressed the accessibility of specific emergency response tools or the
protocols of one specific agency or entity, the court in Communities Actively Liv-
ing Independent & Free (CALIF) v. City of Los Angeles found that the city's emer-
gency preparedness program as a whole failed to meet the mandates of the RA
and the ADA and failed to provide PWDs with "meaningful access" to emer-
gency services.88 The ruling was the first to find the emergency response plan
of an entire city to be noncompliant with the ADA. 8 ' The court ordered the
City to revise its emergency plans to include people with disabilities and to hire
an independent expert to assist with the process. 90 DRA also negotiated a set-
tlement with the County of Los Angeles to revise its emergency plans, securing
significant relief for the nearly 1.3 million people with disabilities in the City
and County of Los Angeles. 91 Later, DRA negotiated similar settlements with
85. About, DISABILITY RTs. ADVOcS. (2015), http://www.dralegal.org/about [http://perma.cc
/ 5BBX-8LYR].
86. Impact, DISABILITY RTs. ADVOCS. (2015), http://dralegal.org/impact [http://perma.cc/84U4
-QAC3.
87. Cmtys. Actively Living Indep. & Free (CALIF) v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 09-0287 CBM
(RZx), 2011 WL 4595993 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1o, 2011).
88. CALIF, at *15 ("Plaintiffs are denied the benefits of the City's emergency preparedness pro-
gram because the City's practice of failing to address the needs of individuals with disabili-
ties discriminates against such individuals by denying them meaningful access to the City's
emergency preparedness program.").
89. See Victoria Kim, Los Angeles' Disaster Plans Discriminate Against People with Disabilities, Judge
Rules, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/20i/feb/12/local/la-me-disabled
-ruling-2O110212 [http://perma.cc/W8QV-VQ82].
go. Order Regarding Injunc. Relief, CALIF, No. CV 09-0287 CBM (RZx), (C.D. Cal. Nov.
9, 2011), http://www.dralegal.org/sites/dralegal.org/files/casefiles/injunctiverelieforder.pdf
[http://perma.cc/62N7-WRC8].
gi. Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
Agreement with County of Los Angeles, CALIF, No. CV 09-0287 CBM (RZx), (C.D.
Cal. June 1O, 2013), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/DR-CA-oo48-ooo5.pdf
[http://perma.cc/62K5-9GAQJ.
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Richmond and Oakland Counties, bringing further relief to PWDs in Califor-
nia.9
2
The victories were significant ones, in part because the court in CALIF did
more than simply find that the City of Los Angeles's plans were not compliant
with the ADA and the RA; it began to set standards for determining what
"meaningful access" means for PWDs in emergency planning at the city level.
First, the court rejected the suggestion that personal planning by individual
PWDs could or should reduce the City's obligations to account for the needs of
PWDs: "The City provides a comprehensive emergency preparedness program
and such program must be open and accessible to all of its residents. It is irrel-
evant for purposes of this action whether individuals should also personally
plan and prepare for emergencies and/or disasters."93 Second, the court reject-
ed the argument that the City could absolve itself of responsibility for planning
specific to P'WDs by delegating responsibility to individual agencies or de-
partments, noting both that "there is no evidence in the record of any City
documents explaining how these departments shall assist individuals with dis-
abilities during an emergency or disaster" and that "individual departments
which have been delegated the responsibility of assisting such individuals simi-
larly have no plans for addressing the needs of [PWIDs]." 94 In making this
finding, the court expressly rejected "[t]he City's contentions that it can make
ad hoc reasonable accommodations upon request,"9" underscoring that a city
that failed to create plans specific to PWDs was noncompliant with the ADA
and RA. Third, the court rejected the City's argument that "the City has not
taken any action which disproportionately burdens people with disabilities."
9 6
Rejecting the defendants' argument that "[p]laintiffs are free to prepare them-
selves to receive the same benefits, whatever they may be, as everyone else in
the City,"97 the court underscored that "[b]ecause individuals with disabilities
require special needs, the City disproportionately burdens them through its fa-
cially neutral practice of administering its program in a manner that fails to ad-
dress such needs." 98 Crucially, the plaintiffs did not need to show affirmative
action by the City with respect to the needs of PWDs; a lack of action could vi-
92. Telephone Interview with Julia Pinover-Kupiec, Staff Attorney, Disability Rights Advocates
(Apr. 8, 2013).
93. CALIF, at *15.
94. Id. at *2.
95. Id. at *14.
96. Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 4:8-9, CALIF, No. CV o9-
0287 CBM (RZx), 2011 WL 4595993 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010).
97. Id. at 11:14-15.
9s. CALIF, 2011 WL 4595993 at *14.
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olate the ADA.9 9 Finally, the court enumerated nine essential components that
effective emergency preparedness plans must include.1° ° Among them are the
development of a comprehensive plan, assessment of the efficacy of that plan,
advance identification of needs and resources, provision of evacuation assis-
tance and transportation, shelter and care for those forced to evacuate their
homes, and post-disaster recovery assistance.'0 ' By describing the required el-
ements of a preparedness plan, finding the City's plan as a whole to be non-
compliant with regard to PWDs, and directing the City's independent expert to
assist with revisions to all components of the City's plans, the court suggested
that "meaningful access" requires cities to ensure that each of the fundamental
components of an emergency plan address the unique needs of PWDs'0° - a de-
cision DRA's co-founder describes as a "breakthrough."'03
Still, the ruling and the subsequent settlements left many questions unan-
swered. Because the plaintiffs had sought "summary judgment solely on the
issue of liability ... the Court consequently [made] no finding as to the appro-
priate remedy."'0 4 Although the court found that "[p]laintiffs have established
that reasonable modification(s) to the City's emergency preparedness program
are available,"'0 5 the court did not enumerate which of the suggested modifica-
tions it found to be "reasonable" - and hence, required - under the ADA and
RA. Thus, while the ruling established that cities should ensure that evacua-
tion, temporary shelter, and other emergency services account for the needs of
PWDs, it did not clearly establish how cities should create such access,"6 and
any modifications agreed to by the City or County of Los Angeles would not
serve as binding legal precedent. More fundamentally, the case and settlement
helped only a small portion of the PWDs threatened by inadequate emergency
planning, and too many PWDs in other urban areas remained at risk. DRA
99. Id.
lOO. Id. at *1.
101. Id.
1o2. Id. at *14-15.
103. Telephone Interview with Sid Wolinsky, Dir. of Litig., Disability Rights Advocates (Feb. 8,
2o15) [hereinafter Wolinsky Interview No. i.
1o4. CALIF, at *16.
lo5. Id.
1o6. The court's ruling discussed the specifics of only one component of emergency planning:
the provision of temporary shelter. The court noted that although the City had a plan for
providing mass shelter for those forced to evacuate their homes in a disaster, "the City does
not know which, if any, of these shelters are architecturally accessible to individuals with
disabilities ... [or] know which, if any of these shelter sites could accommodate people with
specific special needs." Id. at *14.
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could not afford to stop fighting, and before the ink on the Los Angeles case
was dry, DRA had begun to turn its sights to the east.
III. ORIGINS OF BCID V. BLOOMBERG
DRA had been investigating the City of New York's emergency plans for
six months prior to Tropical Storm Irene, 10 7 a destructive cyclone that descend-
ed upon the city in August 2011 and ultimately caused between seven and ten
billion dollars in damage.108 The Center for the Independence of the Disabled,
New York (CIDNY)' 09 had been trying to collaborate with the City on emer-
gency planning for PVDs ever since the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, in an effort "to get the City to understand that its ... response to disas-
ters was laden with barriers. And we hoped that we were making progress." 110
Unfortunately, "[t]he problem with disaster preparedness and response work
is that it is extremely difficult to get people to care until we have an event at
hand," explains Paul Timmons, the Board Chair of Portlight Strategies, a
grassroots organization that assists disabled people in post-disaster situations.
"But if you're one of the [PWDs] who can't access one of those shelters...
you're gonna care a lot.., right up to the point you die in the storm.""'
When Tropical Storm Irene struck the City, the event served as a "reality
check""2 to both CIDNY and DRA. Susan Dooha, the Executive Director of
CIDNY, explains:
Tropical Storm Irene hit the City ... [and CIDNY shared critical emer-
gency information with and surveyed] the 900 PWDs who use our of-
107. Telephone Interview with Julia Pinover-Kupiec, supra note 86.
lo8. See Michael Cooper, Hurricane Cost Seen as Ranking Among Top Ten, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2ol/o8/31/us/ 31floods.html [http://perma.cc/PW52
-AMZ7].
log. The Center for the Independence of the Disabled, New York provides services for PWDs
and is "part of the Independent Living Centers movement: a national network of grassroots
and community-based organizations that enhance opportunities for all people with disabili-
ties to direct their own lives." About Us, CENTER FOR INDEPENDENCE DISABLED, N.Y., http ://
www.cidny.org/about-us.php [http ://perma.cc/2FVY-ZVZZ].
io. Telephone Interview with Susan Dooha, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Independence of Disabled, N.Y.
(Feb. 13, 2015).
mii. Stephen Drake, Guest Blog: Paul Timmons- It's Time To Stop Playing Nice with the Emergency
Management Community After Continued Failure To Serve Disabled Disaster Victims, NOT DEAD
YET: BLOG (Aug. 31, 2011) (first ellipsis added) (quoting Paul Timmons), http://
www.notdeadyet.org/2o ii/o8/guest-blog-paul-timmons-its-time-to.html [http://perma.cc
/VKC2-TDXS].
i. Telephone Interview with Julia Pinover-Kupiec, supra note 86.
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fices, and who lived in Hurricane Zone A and B ... and we heard from
them about their barriers to evacuation. We also went out as the hurri-
cane bore down on the City ... and surveyed shelters and identified
that the shelters were riddled with access barriers .... And because we
were a partner of the City's, and active in their special needs activities,
we brought all of the issues we had identified to the attention of the
City... leading up to the storm, throughout the storm and during its
immediate aftermath. And we kept asking for the problems we had
identified to be addressed ... but essentially we got no response, and
there were no satisfactory resolutions to any of the resolutions raised,
nor was there, evidently, any much curiosity about what we would rec-
ommend to rectify the problems. This was very disappointing to us be-
cause ... we had worked hard to become partners, and we were very
alarmed that ... we were seeing the same issues coming up that we had
seen and warned of many years before.113
At that point, says Dooha, "we thought that it was time to pursue a concerted
effort to bring the City into federal civil rights law compliance. And we were
motivated not only by our frustration, but also by the life-and-death struggles
of people that we serve."' 14 Although Tropical Storm Irene resulted in relatively
few deaths and less damage than had been expected, DRA also "saw the writ-
ing on the wall for a future disaster and decided that [it] had to do some-
thing.""' Disability communities in New York were already all too familiar
with the degree to which the needs of IPWDs would be ignored in times of
emergency. Postmortem studies of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and
the September 2001 terrorist attack revealed that disabled people had been left
behind in both instances."6 Because of the lack of evacuation assistance, PVVDs
"did not even have the choice of whether to leave and were essentially trapped
and left to die."" 7 As Timmons wrote in exasperation shortly before the BCID
case was filed, "We have seen [indifference to the needs of PWDs] in every
domestic disaster to which we've responded .... There's always a lot of talk
and posturing from FEMA and state and local emergency response types.
113. Telephone Interview with Susan Dooha, supra note 11o.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Lessons Learned from the World Trade Center Disaster, supra note 22 (summarizing stud-
ies).
117. Class Action Complaint, supra note 19, at 3.
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DRA was well-prepared to bring a case challenging the adequacy of New
York City's emergency preparedness plan. DRA's experiences in California
gave the organization significant expertise and institutional competence in re-
viewing emergency plans with an eye to meeting the needs of PWDs. "9 Indeed,
at the time of the filing of the case against New York City, DRA was the only
outfit in the country bringing lawsuits of this nature.20 The complaint in BCID
was filed in September 2011, just over a month after Tropical Storm Irene.121
The class action lawsuit alleged that, "Although the Mayor and the City have
created emergency plans for the general population, they have failed to plan
appropriately for the nearly 900,000 disabled persons within New York City
who are especially vulnerable during disasters."1 2 DRA argued that the City's
failure to plan for PWDs violated the ADA, RA, and the New York City Hu-
man Rights Law (NYCHRL).123 Acknowledging the substantial effort and re-
sources the City devoted to emergency preparedness and planning, the com-
plaint echoed the ruling in the CALIF case, 4 arguing that effective plans must
include nine essential components: (1) "comprehensive emergency plans," (2)
"assessments of the efficacy of emergency plans," (3) "identification of the
needs that will arise and resources available to meet those needs," (4) "public
notification and communication," (5) "policies or procedures concerning the
concept of 'sheltering in place,"' (6) "plans to provide shelter and care for indi-
viduals forced to evacuate their homes," (7) "assistance with evacuation and
transportation," (8) "plans for provision of temporary housing when evacuees
cannot return to their homes," and (9) "plans for.., recovery and remediation
efforts after an emergency or disaster. '111S The plaintiffs argued that "with re-
spect to each of these essential components, the Mayor and the City have failed
to consider and address the different, yet critical, needs of persons with disabil-
ities. ", 6 As an example, the complaint alleged that the City failed to provide
American Sign Language interpretation for televised emergency announce-
118. Drake, supra note ill (quoting Paul Timmons).
uug. Telephone Interview with Julia Pinover-Kupiec, supra note 86.
120. Id.
121. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 19.
122. Id. at 1.
123. Id. at 17-24.
124. See CALIF, 2011 WL 4595993 at *13-*15.
125. Class Action Complaint, supra note 19, at 10-12.
126. Id. at 4.
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ments during Tropical Storm Irene.27 The plaintiffs also noted that the City
had shut down bus, subway, and paratransit services in the hours before Irene
and that Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg advised residents that "you'll have to
walk, or you're going to find some way to use a car or taxi," ignoring the fact
that many PWDs cannot walk or take for-hire vehicles, the vast majority of
which are inaccessible.2
8
The case was filed as a class action on behalf of "all persons with disabilities
in the City of New York who have been and are being denied the benefits and
advantages of New York City's emergency preparedness program."129 The
named plaintiffs included representative individuals with disabilities and two
organizational plaintiffs: the Brooklyn Center for the Independence of the Dis-
abled, Inc. (BCID)' 30 and CIDNY. DRA argued that the individual members of
the plaintiff class had been denied meaningful access to the City's emergency
preparedness program as a result of the City's failure to provide for the unique
needs of PWDs. 3 ' In turn, the complaint asserted that the organizational plain-
tiffs were harmed because they were forced to expend time and resources advo-
cating for constituents whose needs were not being met, and to provide direct
disaster relief assistance to those individuals when government entities were
unable to do so.
132
According to Julia Pinover-Kupiec, a lead DRA attorney on the case, "the
suit was brought as a class action because DRA felt that the harms and pro-
posed remedies were broadly applicable to all members of the class, making a
class action the most appropriate vehicle for the claims."1 33 Rather than focus-
ing on harms suffered by individual members of the class, the suit argued that
the plaintiffs as a group were harmed by the absence of emergency planning
that met the needs of PWDs. 34 As relief, the plaintiffs requested a declaration
that the defendants' failure to adequately plan for PWDs in emergencies violat-
ed the ADA, RA, and NYCHRL, and an order requiring the defendants to de-
127. Id. at 2.
128. Id. at 2-3.
129. Id. at 8.
130. BCID is a non-profit, grass roots organization operated by a majority of people with disabil-
ities for people with disabilities. BCID is dedicated to guaranteeing the civil rights of PWDs
and provides services, advocacy, and education and awareness programs by and for PWDs.
BCID is a member of the National Council on Independent Living and the Independent Liv-
ing Network of New York. About BCID, BROOK. CENTER FOR INDEPENDENCE DISABLED
(2015), http://www.bcid.org/aboutbcid [http://perma.cc/PWJ8-CTH9]
131. Id. at i5.
132. Id. at 6.
133. Telephone Interview with Julia Pinover-Kupiec, supra note 86.
134. Class Action Complaint, supra note 19, at 8.
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velop and implement an emergency plan addressing the needs of PWDs.35 Alt-
hough plaintiffs who allege violations under the ADA and RA are also entitled
to seek compensatory damages where policies neutral on their face have result-
ed in disparate impact and "it is clear that the defendant had knowledge of
such disparate impact, ' 6 the plaintiffs did not seek money damages, instead
concentrating on the need for injunctive relief. As Pinover-Kupiec explains, the
suit aimed to compel the City to "focus [] on the formidable task" '37 of creating
a plan that could meet the needs of PWDs during an emergency. "We were re-
ally concerned with achieving substantive relief that would compel the City to
get its act together. Injunctive relief was the core of the complaint because, in




Throughout the complaint, the plaintiffs emphasized that there was no
time to lose. The plaintiffs noted that after the September 11, 2001 attacks,
CIDNY issued a report urging the city to train emergency responders and relief
agencies on how to meet the needs of PWDs and how to conduct outreach to
PWDs to make them aware of what emergency services were available well in
advance of a disaster, but that these lessons had been ignored by the City. 39
The plaintiffs' experiences echoed the findings of the few studies that have ex-
plored the experiences of PVDs in disaster situations, most of which have in-
dicated that "the same access mistakes appear to be made repeatedly in disaster
management activities" and "lessons learned after a disaster about reducing ac-
cess barriers are not subsequently integrated into common practice." 4 The
City "has failed to consistently engage and affirmatively respond to the disabil-
ity community," the plaintiffs wrote in their complaint, and the Office of
Emergency Management (OEM)
has never provided a draft of a plan for which the disability community
can provide input .... As a result, persons with disabilities know very
little or nothing of the City's emergency plans. They do not know, for
instance, how they will be notified, how and if they will be evacuated,
135. Id. at 24.
136. Paradis, supra note 30, at 392.
137. Telephone Interview with Julia Pinover-Kupiec, supra note 86.
138. Id.
139. Class Action Complaint, supra note 19, at 6-7.
140. See, e.g., Grady &Andrew, supra note 69, at 3.
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which shelters are accessible, how and if they will be transported and
what assistance, if any, they will receive. 4
Moreover, they argued, "[t] he City of New York has been on notice for at least
ten years that emergency preparedness for persons with disabilities is lack-
ing," 42 and too little had been done. The time to address this issue, the plain-
tiffs urged, was now.
Over the course of the next year, the plaintiffs and defendants sharply de-
bated two questions: whether the plaintiffs had standing to seek judicial review
of the questions they had raised, and whether class certification was proper in
view of the harms alleged. A plaintiff who seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of establishing standing under Article III of the U.S. Consti-
tution. To establish standing,
(1) "the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact - an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical";
(2) "there must be a causal connection between the injury and the con-
duct complained of"; and
(3) "it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision. '" '43
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, plaintiffs seeking to bring a class ac-
tion must also satisfy four additional requirements: numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy. A class may be certified only if it is "so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable"; "there are questions of law or fact
common to the class"; "the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class"; and "the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."' In addition,
where injunctive relief is sought, a class may be maintained if "the party oppos-
ing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appro-
priate respecting the class as a whole."
'' 45
141. Class Action Complaint, supra note 19, at 12.
142. Id. at 3.
143. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 55S, 56o-61 (1992) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
144. FED. R. CWV. P. 23(a).
145. FED. R. CWv. P. 23 (b)(2).
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In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the injury they suffered was
the absence of an adequate emergency preparedness plan.4 6 They argued that
although "[s]pecific emergencies such as Hurricane Irene and September ith
highlight the glaring deficiencies" of the City's emergency preparedness plans
for PWDs, "these specific events are merely a symptom of the current underly-
ing problem ... [of the] ongoing failure to prepare for the unique needs of
persons with disabilities during emergencies."'47 The plaintiffs' argument on
this point mirrored that of the successful challenge to the adequacy of the evac-
uation plan of the Marshalls store in Savage v. City Place Ltd. Partnership; there,
the court found that "[w] here the harm alleged is directly traceable to a written
policy... there is an implicit likelihood of its repetition in the immediate fu-
ture."148 In the BCID plaintiffs' view, the harm was the City's failure to ade-
quately plan and its lack of preparedness to meet the needs of PWDs in an
emergency; 49 because of this, the injury was common to all members of the
plaintiff class,"' ° and it was unnecessary for the plaintiffs to address the circum-
stances of individual plaintiffs51 who may have been injured by the City's fail-
ure to plan. Because the absence of a plan was a harm that affected all PWDs in
the City, the class consisted of all such people"s2 and, in the plaintiffs' view, sat-
isfied the numerosity, commonality, and typicality requirements for class certi-
fication. s15
The defendants strongly objected to this reasoning, arguing that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing to sue because they had "fail[ed] to identify any putative
class members who have suffered any actual injury in fact arising from Defend-
ants' conduct. s154 The defendants dismissed the supposed harms suffered by
146. Class Action Complaint, supra note 19, at 5-6.
147. Id. at 3-4.
148. No. 2403o6, 2004 WL 3045404, at *4 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 20, 2004) (quoting Fortyune v.
AMC, 364 F.3d 1075, io8i (9 th Cir. 2004)).
149. Class Action Complaint, supra note 19, at 5-6.
i5o. Id. at 16.
151. Plaintiffs' Motion of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Class Certification at
15, Brooklyn Ctr. for the Independence of the Disabled v.. Bloomberg (BCID), 287 F.R.D.
240 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2012) (No. 11-CV-669o) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2012) (stating that the
suit revolved around the City's system-wide failures and that "[t]his is an action based sole-
ly on Defendants' actions, not Plaintiffs' individual circumstances.").
152. Class Action Complaint, supra note 19, at 8.
153. Id. at 16-17.
154. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion To Certify a Pro-
posed Class at 2, Brooklyn Ctr. for the Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg (BCID),
287 F.R.D. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 6690) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2012) [hereinafter
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition].
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individual plaintiffs, underscoring that both named plaintiffs had been aware
of the approach of Tropical Storm Irene and simply "didn't pay that much at-
tention to it.""' Plaintiff Gregory Bell had testified in his deposition that he
and other PWDs were disadvantaged by the City's failure to convey infor-
mation about the boundaries of the evacuation in an accessible manner because
"[t]he information wasn't forthcoming through PSA announcements, news, or
print media," and although television announcements may have directed peo-
ple to visit the City's website, "if you don't have a computer and you're a per-
son who is visually impaired and you can't afford a computer and a screen
reader there's no way you can obtain the information.",, 6 Nevertheless, the de-
fendants insisted that Bell had not suffered an "injury in fact"; rather, all that
Bell had was a generalized worry that his needs as a PWD would not be met in
the event of a future emergency."5 7 Similarly, the defendants emphasized that
plaintiff Tania Morales had successfully accessed the City's website and used it
to determine that her residence was not located within an evacuation zone.1
8
On that same site, she learned the location of a nearby evacuation center, "a
school that she had visited previously and knew to be wheelchair accessible."
1 59
Again, the defendants underscored that "Ms. Morales does not allege any inju-
ries during Irene aside from an inability to access the accessible entrance at this
evacuation center. However, she states in her declaration that she is 'extremely
worried about what would happen' during a future emergency." '6o Citing a
prior case that established that "[i] t is the reality of the threat of repeated injury
that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiffs subjective apprehen-
sions,"'6 ' the defendants maintained that "anxiety about future indeterminate
emergencies does not confer standing. ",, 62 The defendants further maintained
that the plaintiff organizations lacked associational standing, in part because of
their failure to identify any members of their organizations who had been in-
jured during Irene. 6' The defendants insisted that mere fear was not enough
to establish that the plaintiffs had experienced an "injury in fact" or that the de-
155. Id. at 2 (quoting Deposition of Gregory D. Bell at 94, Exhibit A to Declaration of Carolyn E.
Kruk, BCID, 287 F.R.D. 24o (No. ii Civ. 669o), Docket No. 58-1 (hereinafter Bell Deposi-
tion]).
156. Bell Deposition, supra note 155, at 78.
157. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 154, at 4.
158. Id. at 5.
159. Id.
16o. Id. at 6 (citing Deci. of Tonia [sic] Morales, Aug. 29, 2012).
161. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 (1983).
162. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 154, at 12.
163. See, e.g., id. at 16 (citing Decl. of Carolyn E. Kruk, Sept. 17, 2012).
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fendants had violated the ADA, the RA, and the NYCHRL.' 6' According to
Supreme Court precedent cited by the defendants, because the "reasonableness
of [a plaintiffs] fear"-and therefore, the plaintiffs entitlement to standing
based on that fear - "is dependent upon the likelihood of a recurrence of the al-
legedly unlawful conduct," 6, the plaintiffs case should proceed only if the
court found that the City's failures were "continuous and pervasive," such that
future harm to the plaintiffs was probable. 66 In contrast, the Court has held
that "subjective apprehensions ... that . . . a recurrence [of the harmful activi-
ties] would even take place [are] not enough to support standing.", 6,
The defendants asserted that the plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate injury
defeated both their argument for standing and the numerosity element of class
certification. "[S] imply by asserting the existence of 'qualified individuals with
a disability,"' wrote the defendants, "[plaintiffs] have [not] demonstrated the
existence [of] a proposed class of individuals who have been aggrieved by sup-
posedly discriminatory conduct." 68 The defendants argued that in the absence
of "admissible evidence ... demonstrating the existence of a class of individu-
als who suffered an actual violation,'n 6 9 class certification should be denied, as
the numerosity requirement is not satisfied when "plaintiffs fail[] to connect
putative class members with any concrete deprivation." 7 ' The City dismissed
the plaintiffs' "conclusory assertion" that "a large class of ... aggrieved indi-
viduals exists, such that joinder of their claims would be impracticable," insist-
ing that this claim was "without merit.' 71
164. See Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 154, at 12.
165. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8; Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 154, at 12
(citing Lyons n.8).
166. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184-85 (2000)
(describing Lyons as establishing a test for standing that relies on the reasonableness of a
plaintiffs fear, and finding that fear based on probable harm is sufficient to establish injury
in fact).
167. Id. at 184 (citing Lyons, 461 U.S. at io8 n.8). See generally Brian Calabrese, Note, Fear-Based
Standing: Cognizing an Injury-in-Fact, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1445, 1448-49 (2011) (describ-
ing the circumstances under which reasonable fear may be sufficient to establish standing
and noting that courts have "expressed a willingness to grant standing to fear-based claims
... [and] have hinted at expanding the cognizability of alleged fear-based injuries" since the
Friends of the Earth decision).
168. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 154, at 23.
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing LeGrand v. City of New York Trans. Auth., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8020
(E.D.N.Y. May 26, 1999)).
171. Id. at 24.
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People tend to underestimate the risk of disasters,1" and even government
officials are not immune from this tendency. Many of the defendants' argu-
ments implied that the plaintiffs were worrying over nothing and imagining
harms that had not occurred and never would -and the plaintiffs' case would
fail if the court found that the alleged harms were absent or unlikely to recur.
As the plaintiffs awaited the court's decisions on standing and the certification
of the class, they battled not only this generalized tendency to under-plan for
disasters, but also the specific apathy caused by Tropical Storm Irene. Alt-
hough Irene was downgraded from a hurricane shortly before it hit New York,
it was the largest storm to hit the city in twenty-five years. 73 Nonetheless, few
of the dire predictions that had been made before Irene came true, and city
leadership walked away from the experience feeling relieved and satisfied with
the city's level of preparedness. 74 Shortly after Irene, the New York Times re-
ported that "after wide-ranging precautionary measures by city officials... and
issuing evacuation orders for 370,000 people across the city, Hurricane Irene is
likely to be remembered by New Yorkers more for what did not happen than
for what did." 7 At a press conference shortly after Irene, Mayor Bloomberg
said, "[W]e are in pretty good shape because of the exhaustive steps . .. we
took to prepare for whatever came our way.' ' 176 To many, Irene appeared to di-
rectly contradict the plaintiffs' main assertion: that the City was unprepared to
deal with the needs of PWDs during a disaster. The defendants argued that
"[i] n light of the fact that Irene triggered a City-wide evacuation order affect-
ing [more] than 350,000 individuals, many of them with disabilities, the fact
that none of the putative class members suffered any injury during Irene is par-
ticularly striking.""
The court ordered the conclusion of fact discovery by late July 2012. 17' Had
the story stopped there, the questions about the adequacy of the City's plans
would have been answered only by reference to the City's written plans and its
experience during Irene -but nature had other plans in store. In a dramatic
twist of fate, Hurricane Sandy descended on the City in October 2012, putting
172. JOHN C. PINE, HAZARDS ANALYSiS: REDUCING THE IMPACT OF DISASTERs 49 (2d ed. 2015).






177. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 154, at 2-3.
178. Scheduling Order, Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg (BCID),
287 F.R.D. 24o (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. ii Civ. 6690) (July 12, 2012).
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the theories of both parties to the test and throwing the questions posed by the
lawsuit into sharp relief. Outside the courtroom, the people of New York wait-
ed with apprehension as the hurricane wound its way north.
IV. THE PERFECT STORM: CLASS CERTIFICATION & HURRICANE
SANDY
A. Hurricane Sandy Hits
Hurricane Sandy's path remained somewhat unpredictable in the days be-
fore it made landfall in New York, and as late as Friday, October 26, 2012, me-
teorologists and major news outlets were still describing a direct descent on
New York City as just one of several possible scenarios.'79 Nevertheless, Gov-
ernor Andrew Cuomo declared a state of emergency in New York State on that
date, "mobiliz[ing] resources to local governments that otherwise are restricted
to state use only and suspend[ing] regulations that would impede rapid re-
sponse. ",s Some New Yorkers who had succumbed to the hysteria preceding
Tropical Storm Irene may have discounted the severity of the early reports
about Hurricane Sandy, "lulled into a false sense of security" by the false alarm
the earlier storm had posed."' Others were deterred from evacuating because
they did not have any friends or family they could stay with -a limitation that
is particularly common for PWDs whose mobility impairments require them to
remain in accessible environments,s2 As the reports about Sandy's path of de-
179. See, e.g., Jason Samenow, Washington, D.C. Will Not Escape Hurricane Sandy:




18o. Press Release, Governor of N.Y., Governor Cuomo Declares State of Emergency in New
York in Preparation for Potential Impact of Hurricane Sandy (Oct. 26, 2012),
https ://www.governor.ny.gov/press/10262012-sandystateofemergency
[http://perma.cc/AL8Y-2W55].
181. See Getting LES Ready: Learning from Hurricane Sandy To Create a Community-Based Disaster
Plan for the Future, GOLES (GOOD OLD LOWER EAST SIDE), HESTER ST. COLLABORATIVE &
URBAN JUST. CTR. COMMUNITY DEV. PROJECT 18 (2014), http://cdp.urbanjustice.org
/sites/default/files/CDP.WEB.doc Report LESready_2o141117.pdf [http://perma.cc/26FU
-26C6] (describing factors that influenced decisions of residents of the Lower East Side to
shelter in place).
182. See, e.g., Declaration of Joyce Delarosa in Support of Plaintiffs 28, BCID, 287 F.R.D. 24o
(No. 11 Civ. 6690) ("I... do not have any friends or family I could feasibly stay with during
an emergency. My mother does not have an accessible apartment and her elevators are not
reliable. Staying with my sister is also not an option because her apartment is totally inac-
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struction grew more worrisome, the City began to take steps to prepare. On
Sunday, October 28, Mayor Bloomberg issued a mandatory evacuation order of
375,000 people living in the city's low-lying areas.'83 In his address, the Mayor
announced that the City's public transportation system would shut down later
that evening, and that elevators in the high-rise public housing buildings in the
areas that had been ordered to evacuate would also be shut down. 84 Although
the Mayor described the various means through which residents would be no-
tified to evacuate, he did not explain what evacuation assistance, if any, was
available to those who might not be able to get out in time. s Paying scant at-
tention to the challenges faced by elderly and disabled people who had been
granted only a few short hours to evacuate before their elevators were shut off
and public transportation ceased, the Mayor framed people's potential failure
to leave as an irresponsible choice: "[T]hey are being, I would argue, very self-
ish. They are not only endangering their own lives, they're endangering the
lives of others because in an emergency we aren't going to leave them to die.
We're going to come in and save them."
86
In the days and weeks that followed, many would come to question the
Mayor's assertion that the City would not leave anyone to die and would come
to fault the City for its failure to ensure the safety of the residents who had
been left behind. 87 The BCID court would later find that "paratransit began to
shut down only half an hour after the Mayor issued the evacuation order, while
subway and bus service remained open for at least eight more hours. ,,88 As the
U.S. Attorney's Office of the Southern District of New York noted in a state-
ment of interest, because Access-A-Ride requires PWDs to make advance
bookings and its services were stopped altogether shortly after the Mayor's
speech, "even individuals with disabilities who had planned ahead to be evacu-
ated on October 28, well in advance of the landfall of Hurricane Sandy, could
cessible for me because of my wheelchair .... I have several family members and cousins in
New York City. Most of them do not have accessible apartments.").
183. Michael Howard Saul, Parts of New York City Evacuated for Hurricane Sandy, WALL ST. J.,




186. Id. (quoting news conference announcing evacuation).
187-. Observation based on my personal experiences organizing post-disaster relief efforts in the
wake of Hurricane Sandy. See supra note 18 (describing my role as an organizer of People's
Relief).
18. Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg (BCID), 980 F. Supp. 2d S88,
644 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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have been left effectively stranded." Is9 However, in the immediate aftermath of
the storm, the growing crisis of those abandoned in high-rise buildings had yet
to come to the attention of many members of the public or many officials in
charge of the City's emergency response.' 9° Instead, electricity was restored to
Manhattan much sooner than to the outer boroughs, l9' leading many people to
conclude that the immediate crisis had largely ended only a few days after the
storm.92 Just shy of a week after Sandy, Mayor Bloomberg announced that
"the city had been inundated with well-meaning people dropping off goods at
relief centers" and "what would be the most helpful is [monetary] dona-
189. Statement of Interest of the United States at 19, BCID, 98o F. Supp. 2d 588 (No. 11 Civ.
6690).
19o. Eric Lipton & Michael Moss, Housing Agency's Flaws Revealed by Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2ol2/12/lo/nyregion/new-york-city-housing-agency-was
-overwhelmed-after-storm.html [http://perma.cc/A7ZH-N9WW]. (noting that the city did
"not assess the medical needs of residents stuck atop darkened, freezing towers until nearly
two weeks after the storm").
191. Sarah Maslin Nur, In Sight of Manhattan Skyline, Living Forlorn and in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/1/o5/nyregion/in-sight-of-manhattan-skyline
-a-population-lives-forlorn-and-in-the-dark.html [http://perma.cc/REP9-HBMB]; Track-
ing Power Outages, Day by Day, Hour by Hour, METRoFocus (Nov. 5, 2012),
http://www.thirteen.org/metrOfOcus/2012/11/tracking-power-outages-day-by-day-hour-by
-hour [http://perma.cc/GE3Z-QyHs] (timeline of Con Edison power outages and restora-
tion of power depicting substantial restoration of power to Manhattan, but not the outer
boroughs, by November 4, 2012).
192. Many news outlets focused disproportionately on restoration of power to Manhattan, even
as the crisis in the outer boroughs continued. See, e.g., Barbara Ross & Victoria Cavaliere,
Electricity Returns to Parts of Lower Manhattan, Con Ed Says Full Restoration Could
Happen by Saturday Night, N.Y. DAILY NEwS, Nov. 2, 2012, http://www.nydailynews
.com/new-york/power-returns-parts-manhattan-article-1.1195804 [http://perma.cc/S8GY-
2HEU] (headline and lead description focusing on restoration of power in Manhattan, in-
cluding some power restored ahead of schedule, despite acknowledgment within the text of
ongoing problems in other boroughs)See also Stephen Gandel, How Con Ed Turned New
York City's Lights Back On, FORTUNE, Nov. 12, 2012, http://fortune.com/2ol2/ix/12/how
-con-ed-turned-new-york-citys-lights-back-on [http://perma.cc/6FL7-GMT8] (focusing on
Con Ed's ability to restore power to Manhattan in just four days, stating that Con Ed had
"recovered from the super storm" and arguing that "by all accounts, Con Ed's customers
fared better in the wake of Hurricane Sandy than those of other nearby utilities," despite the
acknowledgement that "elderly or sick residents (in Red Hook] are stuck on high floors
with no heat, power or elevator service."). As a different outlet explained, "Those living
through the worst-case situation may [have] account[ed] for just a few percent of the
850,000 Con Edison customers who lost power, but their numbers could still add up to tens
of thousands of households." Patrick McGeehan, Wait for Power May Linger for Some, N.Y.
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tions."'93 At this point, however, many people living in the outer boroughs -
including thousands of elderly and disabled people in nursing and adult homes
the City had decided not to evacuate - remained trapped and in dire need of
help. '94 As the New York Times would later conclude, "[a]gain and again, city
officials publicly predicted that the crisis . . .was on the verge of being re-
solved, contributing to a perception at City Hall"-and beyond-"that there
was no need to mobilize an extensive effort to provide medical care"19 and oth-
er assistance.
As much of the city began to breathe a sigh of relief, the harmful effects of
the storm on the people who had been abandoned continued to multiply.
Many high-rise buildings had lost all heat, water, and electricity, shutting
down elevators for days and weeks on end. 9 6 Although the City's emergency
response teams and representatives from FEMA and the Red Cross set up relief
centers in impacted neighborhoods, more than ten days passed before City of-
ficials coordinated door-to-door canvassing efforts inside buildings to identify
elderly, sick, and disabled people in need of assistance. 97 Fellow residents
helped to meet the needs of many of their neighbors,198 seeing them through
until official emergency responders at last made their way to the scene. But in
many buildings, all but the most profoundly disabled and elderly residents had
already evacuated,' 99 and those who remained were not well equipped to help
193. Catherine Rampell, Volunteers Flock to Disaster Areas, Overwhelming City Relief
Centers, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/1/o5/nyregion
/volunteers-and-donations-flock-to-areas-affected-by-hurricane-sandy.html [http://perma
.cc/R8JR-E3BK].
194. Jennifer Preston et al., Behind a Call that Kept Nursing Home Patients in Storm's Path, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/03/nyregion/call-that-kept-nursing
-home-patients-in-sandys-path.html [http://perma.cc/7YQO-2J2T] (stating that, per a de-
cision by Mayor Bloomberg, " thousands of elderly, disabled and mentally ill residents re-
main[ed] in more than 40 nursing homes and adult homes in flood-prone areas of New
York City" as Hurricane Sandy approached).
19s. Lipton & Moss, supra note 19o.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. Daniel Marans, In Coney Island Public Housing, People's Relief and Local Residents
Fill Void Left by Government, TRUTHOUT (Nov. 20, 2012), http://truth-out.org/news/item
/12853-in-coney-island-public-housing-peoples-relief-and-lcal-residents-f-void-left-by
-government [http://perma.cc/2RWX-ZCSN] (describing "horror scenes as . . .residents
[began door-to-door canvassing and] discovered seniors and people with disabilities who
may have been in danger of death or other serious health problems" and the efforts of tenant
association presidents who coordinated other residents to deliver supplies to those in need).
199. Id. (describing the concentration of seniors on the high floors of mixed population public
housing buildings that had largely been evacuated).
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each other?" Untrained volunteers stepped in to fill the gaps that official re-
sponse teams had left behind, coordinating major grassroots relief efforts to
knock on doors, deliver necessary supplies, and help residents coordinate
emergency medical evacuations where needed."' In many instances, the situa-
tions that volunteers encountered behind closed apartment doors were grim.
Many elderly and disabled people were lacking basic necessities such as food
and water."° Others had run out of necessary medications, or had begun to
miss vital dialysis, chemotherapy, and other medical appointments. 3 Still oth-
ers had been isolated from the friends, relatives, and aides who typically cared
for them1° 4 - people who were unable to reach those who were trapped as a re-
sult of the shutdown of public transportation 5 and the severe gas shortages
that hindered car travel in the weeks after Sandy." 6 Although the volunteers
aoo. See Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg (BCID), 98o
F. Supp. 2d 588, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("There is substantial evidence that people
with disabilities were stuck in high-rise buildings after the storm."); Reuven Blah &
Simone Weichselbaum, Stranded: Scores of Brooklyn and Queens Seniors Still Without Power
in Cold, Dark Apartments, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. IS, 2012, http://www.nydailynews
.co nnew-york/brooklyn/stranded-scores-brooklyn-queens-elderly-stuck-cold-dark-hmes
-article-1.1202899 [http://perma.cc/898QZTRV].
ao0. Williams Cole, After Sandy, the People's Relief Grows in Coney, BROOK. RAIL (Dec. 1o, 2012),
http ://www.brooklynrail.org/2012/12/Iocal/after-sandy-the-peoples-relief-grows-in-coney
[http://perma.cc/ZMK- 4ECW] (quoting Eric Moed, a volunteer organizer of a grassroots
relief effort who arrived in Coney Island on November 4, 2012 and found that volunteers
.were the only ones going door-to-door asking people what the situation was and what they
needed" because "[s]omehow ... agencies and large-scale organizations didn't seem to have
a plan for needs assessment on that face-to-face level").
ao2. See Blah & Weichselbaum, supra note 195.
203. Lara Weibgen, a volunteer organizer, described encountering residents of high-rise build-
ings: "There have been a lot of people who, for example, ran out of their prescriptions....
We met a woman who was supposed to be getting dialysis three times a week and hadn't
gotten it. There was a man who had missed-who was supposed to be getting cancer treat-
ments every single day, and had missed something like eight or nine [treatments]." Hurri-
cane Sandy and a People's Relief, MOYERS & COMPANY (Nov. 16, 2012), http://billmoyers
.com/content/peoples-relief [http://perma.cc/859V-QHE8] (at 04:00).
204. Observation based on my personal experiences organizing post-disaster relief efforts in the
wake of Hurricane Sandy. See supra note 18 (describing my role as an organizer of People's
Reliefo.
205. See SARAH KAUFMAN ET AL., NYU WAGNER GRADUATE SCH. OF PUB. SERV., TRANSPORTA-
TION DURING AND AFrER HURRICANE SANDY lo (Nov. 2012), http://wagner.nyu.edu/files
/rudincenter/sandytransportation.pdf [http://perma.cc/BRQ8-6AY3] (noting that services
on most subway connections between Manhattan and Brooklyn were not restored until No-
vember 4, 2012 and that lines did not return to Coney Island and the Rockaways until No-
vember 7 and November 11, respectively).
2o6. See Victoria Cavaliere, A Week After Hurricane Sandy, Gas Shortage Nightmare Drags on
for New Yorkers, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/new
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helped to meet many residents' immediate and critical needs," 7 most volun-
teers had no training in medical care or emergency response and had few, if
any, qualifications, apart from their willingness to assist. 8
The City eventually coordinated a canvassing effort to send health care pro-
fessionals and members of the National Guard to high-rise buildings that re-
mained without power, 9 but at that point, countless people had been living in
perilous circumstances and sheer misery almost two weeks."1° They would con-
tinue to do so until their heat, water, and power was fully restored." Residents
subsisted on canned food and military protein packs. 2 People were not able to
bathe and were forced to defecate in buckets.1 3 The scale of human suffering
for all of the people compelled to live in high-rise caves during this period was
extreme, but it was clear that PWDs were disproportionately likely to have suf-
fered as a result of official neglect.' 
4
-york/gas-nightmare-drags-new-yorkers-article-i. 119815o [http://perma.cc/3JRS-YG2F];
Linda I. Gibbs & Caswell F. Holloway, Hurricane Sandy After Action: Report and Recommen-
dations to Mayor Michael R Bloomberg, N.Y.C 13, 21-22 (2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html
/recovery/downloads/pdf/sandy-aar_5.2.13.pdf [http://perma.cc/RU6V-6T84]; observation
as to the cause of people's inability to reach those who were trapped based on my personal
experiences, see supra note 18 (describing my role as an organizer of People's Relief).
207. See, e.g., Anne Lekas Miller, Op-Ed, Sandy's Secret Survivors: Old, Disabled and Invisible
in the Rockaways, TRUTHOUT (Nov. 16, 2012), http://truth-out.org/opinioiitem
/1274 9-sandys-secret-survivors-old-disabled-and-invisible-in-the-rockaways [http://perma
.cc/T5VE-7QVJ]
zo8. Getting LES Ready, supra note 181, at 2-3 ("community-based organizations... did not have
adequate resources or proper training to be relief organizations."); see also Video: Coney Is-
land Residents Remain Without Heat, Hot Water Two Weeks After Superstorm Sandy,
DEMOCRACY Now!, Nov. 15, 2012, http://www.democracynow.org/blog/2olz/u/15/video
coney-island residents remainwithout heat hot water two weeksafter saperstorm_s
andy http://perma.ccEA3R-593L] (interview with me in my capacity as relief organizer
stating that "We for the most part have no experience doing disaster management").
209. Lipton & Moss, supra note 19o.
210. See Miller, supra note 207.
211. See Lipton & Moss, supra note 197.
212. See Hurricane Sandy and a People's Relief, supra note 203 (showing centers collecting canned
goods for residents).
213. See Daniel Marans, Occupy Sandy Volunteer Sounds Alarm on "Humanitarian Crisis," Near-
Complete Absence of Government Aid in Coney Island Projects, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG
(Nov. 12, 2012, 3:28 P.M.), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-marans/occupy-sandy
-volunteers b 2101396.html rhttp://perma.cc/R2A4-WRY81.
214. See Sasha Chavkin, After Resisting, Mayor Proposes Disaster Registry, N.Y. WORLD, June 13,
2013, http://www.thenewyorkworld.conV2013/o6/13/disaster-registry (stating that "elderly
and disabled residents represented .nearly half [of] the storm-related fatalities in the city.").
See also Sasha Chavkin, Special-Needs Registries Saved Lives During Sandy, But Not in
NYC, N.Y. WORLD, Jan. 16, 2013, http://www.thenewyorkworld.coM/2o13/01/16/disaster
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Many questions would be raised in the months that followed. Why were
people left behind? Why had so many failed to evacuate? Who was responsi-
ble? How could the City make sure that this would never happen again? And
quietly, a lawsuit that would help to answer some of these questions began to
move ahead. On November 7, 2012, United States District Judge Jesse M. Fur-
man issued the opinion and order certifying the proposed class in BCID v.
Bloomberg." Writing from his home office2 6 because the downtown federal
courthouse was shut down as a result of Hurricane Sandy,' 7 Judge Furman af-
firmed that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue the case and could do so as a
unified class.'
B. Standing To Sue and Class Certification
Judge Furman has stated that his decision was in no way influenced by
Hurricane Sandy and that the issuance of the order at a moment when disabled
New Yorkers remained trapped in their apartments was purely coincidental. 9
Nevertheless, in finding that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue the case,
Judge Furman spoke directly to the manner in which Hurricane Sandy had
brought the plaintiffs' contentions of harm into sharp relief. Discounting the
defendants' emphasis on concrete injuries that the individual named plaintiffs
may or may not have suffered as a result of the City's emergency planning and
procedures, Judge Furman held that "that contention misses the point ....
The gravamen of plaintiffs' claims is, first and foremost, that they have been,
and continue to be, deprived of benefits afforded to other citizens - namely, the
benefits of an adequate emergency preparedness program."" ° Because plain-
tiffs alleged a present injury-lack of access to an effective emergency plan-
they had standing to bring the case.
-registries (revealing that "[n]early half of the 43 New Yorkers who died from the storm
were elderly, a rate almost four times higher than senior citizens' share of the city popula-
tion.").
21s. Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg (BCID), 287 F.R1D. 24o
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
216. Judge Jesse M. Furman, Remarks Following Address at Yale Law School: Law and Econom-
ic Policy (Apr. 8, 2014).
217. After Hurricane Sandy, Courts in New York Struggle To Restore Operations, U.S. CTS. (Nov. 5,
2012, 1:oo PM), http://news.uscourts.gov/after-hurricane-sandy-courts-new-york-struggle
-restore-operations [http ://perma.cc/9RKD-CRLL].
218. BCID, 287 F.R.D 24o.
219. Judge Furman, supra note 216.
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Judge Furman also found that the plaintiffs had standing "based on the
threat of future harm and the fear and apprehension caused by it."'' Speaking
directly to the disaster unfolding outside, he wrote:
It is, of course, not possible to know with certainty if or when disaster
will strike the City, but- as the tragic events of the past few weeks
make abundantly clear-it is beyond "mere conjecture" that another
disaster, whether natural or manmade, will occur and that it will seri-
ously affect members of the proposed class.'
Judge Furman further underscored the urgency of the plaintiffs' claims by
finding that "a court would be in no better position later than now to resolve
the claims presented. Indeed, to conclude otherwise would be perverse, as it
would mean that plaintiffs could bring their claims only after their worst fears
had been realized." 
3
Judge Furman also granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification,
briefly addressing the requirements of typicality, commonality, and adequacy
of representation, and rejecting the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs
had failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement.' Though the defendants al-
leged that the plaintiffs had failed to produce any individuals harmed by the
City's alleged planning failures during Tropical Storm Irene, much less a sig-
nificant number of PWDs who were so harmed, "that assertion is based on the
same fundamental misunderstanding of plaintiffs' claims that drove defend-
ants' arguments about standing," wrote the court." The court held that the
issue was not the specific injuries suffered by individual plaintiffs during one
disaster, but the fact that all PWDs in the City were alleged to have been de-
prived of the benefit of appropriate emergency preparedness planning. " 6 Be-
cause of this, "the relevant class of people is therefore all people with disabili-
ties in the City," and the numerosity requirement- the only element of class
certification that the defendants had seriously challenged-was "plainly satis-
fied. 7
221. Id. at 415.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 417-19.
225. Id. at 418.
226. Id. at 414.
227. Id.
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C. Wal-Mart v. Dukes: The Challenge That Wasn't
Judge Furman considered the plaintiffs' motion for class certification with-
in a legal landscape reshaped by the Supreme Court's 2011 decision in Wal-
Mart Stores v. Dukes.7 s Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) was
designed to facilitate structural reform litigation, the Wal-Mart decision im-
posed more stringent requirements on class certification, and in particular the
element of commonality. The court held that the claims of a proposed class
must not only be based on a "common contention," but one "capable of class-
wide resolution -which means that determination of its truth or falsity will re-
solve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one
stroke." 9 It is insufficient to show that proposed class members "have all suf-
fered a violation of the same provision of law";230 " [w]hat matters to class cer-
tification ... is not the raising of common 'questions' . . . but, rather, the ca-
pacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation." 231
In the aftermath of the decision, many legal experts worried that Wal-Mart
had significantly changed the landscape for structural reform litigation in the
United States and would make it difficult, if not impossible, to bring broad-
based class actions.232 Nevertheless, shortly after the decision was issued, courts
began to issue opinions that sought to cabin its influence, underscoring that
Wal-Mart did not preclude class certification where a single policy affected all
class members and the experiences and interests of all class members were
closely aligned. 33 In one case, a Pennsylvania district court certified a class of
pre-trial detainees of a county jail who sought to challenge the constitutionality
of the jail's delousing policy, finding that, "[u]nlike Dukes, where commonality
was destroyed where there was no 'common mode of exercising discretion that
pervade[d] the entire company,' here there is a solid policy that applied directly
228. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
229. Id. at 2551.
230. Id.
231. Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 97, 132 (2009) (emphasis omitted)).
232. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARv. L. REv. 78, 154 n.451 (2011) ("The decision's
breadth prompted the AlI and American Bar Association to host a discussion titled 'Wal-
Mart v. Dukes: Death of Complex Class Actions?"' (citing Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Death
of Complex Class Actions, ALI-CLE, http://www.ali-aba.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=courses
.course&coursecode=TSTIo5 [http://perma.cc/G5BU-4WEB])).
233. See, e.g., Connor B., ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 278 F.RD. 30 (D. Mass. 2011); Logory v. Cnty.
of Susquehanna, 277 F.RD. 135 (M.D. Pa. 2011).
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to all potential class members."234 In another case, a Massachusetts district
court refused to de-certify, on the basis of Wal-Mart, a class of children placed
in foster care who alleged harm as a result of systemic deficiencies within state
foster care system.23s Stressing the significance of the plaintiffs' challenge to a
single policy, the court wrote:
Unlike the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart, who did not allege any specific, over-
arching policy of discrimination, Plaintiffs have alleged specific and
overarching systemic deficiencies ... that place children at risk of harm.
These deficiencies, rather than the discretion exercised by individual
case workers, are the alleged causes of class members' injuries ....
These systemic shortcomings provide the "glue" that unites Plaintiffs'
claims.236
The court rejected the notion that Wal-Mart represented a death knell for
structural reform litigation, insisting that "the Wal-Mart decision did not
change the law for all class action certifications. Instead, it provided guidance
on how existing law should be applied to expansive, nationwide class actions
,,237
As the BCID case unfolded, courts around the country had just begun to
consider the impact of Wal-Mart on litigation on behalf of PWDs, but no clear
consensus had emerged. In one California case, a federal court certified a class
of PWDs who alleged that the defendant, a national park system, systemically
discriminated against PWDs by failing to provide adequate accommodations
that would permit access to park facilities.38 The court held that, unlike in
Wal-Mart, where "evidence presented to support commonality [was found to
be] insufficient because it did not show a common reason for the alleged dis-
parate treatment of female employees ... Rehabilitation Act claims do not re-
quire proof of the intent behind the alleged barriers,"239 but only a showing of
denial of the benefit of certain programs or activities. Based on the difference in
emphasis between intent versus impact, the court concluded that "Wal-Mart is
not closely on point."" 0 Other courts considering disability rights cases found
234. Logory, 277 F.R.D. at 143 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Dukes,
131 S. Ct. at 2554-55).
235. Connor B., 278 F.R.D. at 30.
236. Id. at 34.
237. Id. at 33.
238. Gray v. Golden Gate Nat'l Recreational Area, 279 F.R.D. 501 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
239. Id. at 518.
24o. Id.; see also Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587, 595 (D. Or. 2012) (likewise concluding that in
a case alleging violations of the ADA and RA, Wal-Mart was "not closely on point").
2445
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
that Wal-Mart required much more than a showing of a common reason for
alleged disparate treatment.241 For instance, shortly after Wal-Mart was decid-
ed, the D.C. Circuit de-certified a class of disabled school-age children who al-
leged violations of their rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act (IDEA) and Rehabilitation Act, holding that,
After Wal-Mart it is clear that defining the class by reference to the
[challenged school district's] pattern and practice of failing to provide
[a free and adequate public education to special needs children] speaks
too broadly because it constitutes only an allegation that the class
members "have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law."2"
In the absence of a "single or uniform policy or practice that bridges all [of the
class members'] claims,"24 the court held that class certification was inappro-
priate.
In BCID, because the City's emergency response services depended on co-
ordinating the efforts of numerous agencies and programs and-per the de-
fendants' theory of the harm -the City's alleged failures toward members of
the plaintiff class manifested themselves in many different ways, Judge Furman
could have interpreted the case as presenting a series of failures rather than a
single common policy, reading the Wal-Mart decision as precluding certifica-
tion of the plaintiff class. Instead, he construed Wal-Mart narrowly, citing to
the case only for the proposition that there must be a common contention ca-
pable of class-wide resolution, then relying on an earlier case to hold that
"[t]he test for commonality... 'is not demanding' and is met so long as there
is at least one issue common to the class." 2" Disposing of a potentially contro-
241. See, e.g., DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Jamie S. v. Milwaukee
Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 498 (7 th Cir. 2012) (finding that certification of a class of children
whose rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Act were said to have been violated was
improper because the necessity of addressing questions of fact and law unique to each
child's situation posed the same "basic commonality problem [as] in Wal-Mart"); Swan ex
rel. 1.0. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, No. 13 C 3623, 2013 WL 4047734, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 9, 2013) (finding that in a suit challenging the closure of special education programs as
a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, establishing a single policy by which all
proposed class members were affected was insufficient to establish commonality sufficient
for class certification under Wal-Mart, which requires a showing that the plaintiffs suffer
the same injury).
242. DL, 713 F.3d at 126 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)).
243. Id. at 127.
2. Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg (BCID), 290 F.R.D. 409, 418
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versial issue in just a few words, Judge Furman certified the class and allowed
the case to move forward.
D. How Hurricane Sandy Impacted the Case
Immediately after the class was certified, the defendants requested that the
trial be adjourned, citing the ongoing impact of Hurricane Sandy on their of-
fices and staff. "[K]ey City witnesses are completely occupied with the City's
recovery efforts ... [and] it does not serve the interests of the citizens of New
York City, including members of the class, to divert these individuals from this
critical work to prepare for a trial to commence in December.""5 The court
granted the defendants' request, noting that "the immediate priority of the city
has to be dealing with what is going on outside of this courtroom" 46 and mov-
ing the trial date to March 2013.z4 Judge Furman also called on the parties to
re-open discovery to permit the presentation of evidence related to the City's
response to Hurricane Sandy. 48 Although the court had initially ordered the
completion of expert discovery by October 29 4 9 - the very day Sandy would
descend on New York"' -Judge Furman concluded that "the recent events...
. have obvious bearing on the matter to be tried"2"' and "how the plans faired
[sic] and what the plans were with respect to the recent emergency would pre-
sumably be, if not the best evidence, certainly highly relevant and highly pro-
bative evidence"2"2 for the court to consider. As the City continued to conduct
its relief and emergency response efforts, it did so with the knowledge that its
actions would very soon be put on trial.
245. Letter from Martha Calhoun, Assistant Corp. Counsel, City of N.Y. Law Dep't., to Hon.
Jesse M. Furman at 1, BCID, 290 F.R.D. 409 (No. i:11-cv-o669o-JMF), ECF No. 67.
246. Transcript of Hearing Before Hon. Jesse M. Furman on Nov. 16, 2012 at 2, 1o, 11, BCID, 290
F.R.D. 409 (No. 1:11-cv-o669o-JMF) [hereinafter Transcript of Hearing].
247. Scheduling Order, BCID, 290 F.R.D. 409 (No. 1:11-cv-o669o-JMF), ECF No. 72.
248. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 246, at 2 (explaining that the trial would be adjourned "to
allow the parties to engage ... in a limited amount of discovery with respect to how things
were handled in Hurricane Sandy").
249. Revised Pre-Trial Scheduling Order, BCID, 29o F.R.D. 409 (No. 1:1-cv-o669o-JMF), ECF
No. 32.
25O. Willie Drye, A Timeline of Hurricane Sandy's Path of Destruction, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Nov.
2, 2012), http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.con/2012/i/o2/a-timeline-of-hurricane
-sandys-path-of-destruction [http://perma.cc/JLsW-NJL9].
251. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 246, at 2.
252. Id. at lo.
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As Judge Furman would later explain, Hurricane Sandy "provided a real-
time test of the plaintiff's theories,"253 and real-life events made many of the
statements listed in the complaint seem eerily prescient. Months beforehand,
the plaintiffs had cautioned that "[i]f evacuation and transportation from af-
fected areas is necessary, a city must make plans for assisting those who cannot
evacuate on their own. For example, persons in wheelchairs or scooters may
not be able to leave their building without electricity to operate the eleva-
tors."5 4 As stories of residents trapped in high-rise apartments in Coney Is-
land, the Rockaways, and Red Hook began to emerge, it seemed as though the
complaint had been ripped from the headlines, or the other way around."'5
Although the underlying theory behind the case did not change as a result
of Sandy, Pinover-Kupiec, one of the DRA attorneys on the case, believes that
the descriptions of the horrific experiences of PWDs during Sandy made the
plaintiffs' case much stronger.5 6 Many of the plaintiffs' stories were harrow-
ing, and their personal experiences exposed how inadequate the City's official
disaster response had been. For instance, the testimony of Kenneth Martinez, a
wheelchair user, illustrated the grave deficiencies in the City's reliance on pub-
lic transportation as a means of evacuating PWDs. When Martinez attempted
to evacuate from his home in Far Rockaway, Queens - a peninsula that was one
of the areas most severely impacted by Hurricane Sandy257- "the buses were so
jammed full of people that there was no room for me in my wheelchair. " 58 Alt-
hough he waited for more buses to come, he was eventually forced to return
home out of fear that the rain would cause his motorized wheelchair to
"short[] out."259 The following day, Martinez repeatedly called 311, the City's
general hotline for government information, but he was only able to get
through after many hours -only to be told that he "should have evacuated the
253. Judge Furman, supra note 216.
254. Class Action Complaint, supra note 19, at 14.
255. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 207 (headine describing Sandy's "secret survivors" in the Rocka-
ways as "old, disabled, and invisible"); Ben Fractenberg and Janey Upadhye, Disabled
and Elderly Stuck in Coney Island Building Week After Sandy, DNAINFO (Nov.
5, 2012), http://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/2o1211o/coney-island/disabled-elderly-stuck
-coney-island-building-week-after-sandy [http://perma.cc/R54B-SV3U].
256. Telephone Interview with Julia Pinover-Kupiec, supra note 86.
257. See e.g. Mapping Hurricane Sandy's Deadly Toll, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 17, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.con/interactive/2012/11/17/nyregion/hurricane-sandy-map.html (map
displaying seven Sandy-related deaths in the Rockaways, one in Coney Island, and two in
Manhattan).
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prior day. "26° Absent accessible transportation and timely evacuation assis-
tance, Martinez became trapped in his first-floor apartment when the storm
waters surged, floating up to the ceiling and narrowly avoiding a death by
drowning with help from his neighbors: "It is a miracle I am alive today, no
thanks to the City, which never came to help me.
26 1
The plaintiffs' attorneys submitted additional depositions and documents
to bolster their case and added several named plaintiffs who had been affected
by Hurricane Sandy, but doing so presented unique challenges. "The damage
done by Sandy, particularly in light of the [lack of] disaster planning for
PWDs, made it difficult to stay in touch with clients and to communicate with
them," explains Sid Wolinsky, the co-founder and Director of Litigation of
Disability Rights Advocates. 6' "It was a real education for me as an attorney,"
says Pinover-Kupiec. "I had never worked with people in such difficult circum-
stances as this. "263
E. The Trial
As seen in the parties' briefs, evidence, and in the weeklong trial, the par-
ties' views on what constitutes effective emergency planning differed in several
key respects. First, the defendants insisted that residents of the City are best
served when emergency responders are allowed to maintain a degree of flexibil-
ity that enables them to respond quickly to the situation at hand. "[I] ndividual
circumstances vary almost infinitely," the defendants wrote, and "so too the ar-
ray of appropriate and lawful responses that government may implement in
order to make its program available to a diverse community. The ADA should
not require a cookie cutter approach to emergency planning, nor prescribe [sic]
specific governmental responses to individual needs." 264 However, the defend-
ants' emphasis on individual circumstances and needs stood in direct contrast
to the plaintiffs' contention that PWDs as a group were disadvantaged by the
City's failure to plan for their needs., 6 ' As the plaintiffs saw it, the City's inade-
quate understanding of and attention to the needs of PWDs as a whole made it
impossible for the City to address the needs of any specific disabled individual.
26o. Id. para. 38.
261. Id. para. 3.
262. Telephone Interview with Sid Wolinsky, Sid Wolinsky, Dir. of Litig., Disability Rights Ad-
vocates (Feb. 8, 2015) [hereinafter Wolinsky Interview No. 2]..
263. Telephone Interview with Julia Pinover-Kupiec, supra note 86.
264. Defendants' Pre-Trial Memorandum of Law at ii, BCID, 287 F.R.D. 24o (No. 11 Civ.
6690).
265. Class Action Complaint at 8, supra note i9.
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A comprehensive plan would not seek to limit the flexibility of emergency re-
sponders but would instead provide a framework to help ensure that tools and
strategies adequate to meet the needs of PWDs would be available.266
Second, the parties diverged sharply in their views of how much of the
City's overall planning should be delegated to individual agencies and non-
governmental organizations. In its opening statement and throughout the trial,
the City emphasized that "central to the plans and services that the City devel-
ops at every level, is developing relationships; roles, responsibilities, and rela-
tionships. ",267 In the City's view, the Office of Emergency Management (OEM)
could fulfill its responsibility to plan in significant part by designating roles for
other agencies and entities: "Emergency plans do describe actions, but even
more importantly, they serve to get the right agency partners mobilized to
identify and mitigate any impact. ",26s However, in the plaintiffs' opinion, the
City relied too heavily on other agencies to carry out tasks for which the OEM
was ultimately responsible, and did so with no clear understanding of how, or
if, those agencies would actually meet the needs of PWDs. Nowhere was this
conflict more evident than during the examination of Aaron Belisle, OEM's
Special Needs Coordinator and the sole OEM staffer whose job title specifically
focused on the needs of PWDs during a disaster. 69 Belisle was questioned by a
plaintiffs' attorney who contended that "OEM has never done a study to de-
termine if the fire department will have the capacity, or the ability, to actually
evacuate people with disabilities from their apartments in the event of a mass
emergency." 70 Belisle responded "[t]here is not a study that I'm aware of," 7
even while acknowledging that the Fire Department had "primary responsibil-
ity for evacuations in emergency."' Later, Judge Furman pressed Belisle on
this same point, confirming that Belisle was "not aware of any plans of the fire
department or the police department or the content of any plans with respect
266. Id. at 1O-15.
267. Transcript of Bench Trial at 35, BCID, 287 F.R.D. 24o (No. 11 Civ. 6690) [hereinafter Trial
Transcript].
268. Id. at 37.
269. Id. at 281-82.
270. Id. at 291.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 290 (question of plaintiff's attorney Daniel L. Brown, addressing the City's failure
to "assess[] the capacity of the fire and police departments to carry out the tasks assigned to
them under OEM's emergency plans"); id. at 291-92 (describing how "[e]ach agency can
have their own tactical plan that is supported by [OEM's] plan .... [F]or example,... fire
can have a tactical plan about what fire does" and stating that "the fire department plays a
key role" in evacuations in an emergency).
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to . . . evacuations of people with disabilities from high-rises."273 Belisle con-
firmed that this was so, but seemed unperturbed by his limited knowledge, re-
plying: "I have confidence that the fire department knows how to evacuate
people.. . ."' When asked about her perceptions of the trial, Susan Dooha of
CIDNY would wryly remark that she "was surprised that the people who were
responsible were the ones who were admitting that they basically didn't have a
clue. "275
Third, the parties had significantly different views about what failings
could be excused by exigent circumstances. The defendants argued that
"[w]here non-compliance with the overarching policy goals of the statute-
access for everyone-is temporary, courts have declined to find a violation." 
6
In the defendants' eyes, the ADA was "not violated by temporary inaccessibility
of any specific aspect of [an emergency response] program," such as "an unex-
pected blackout in a high-rise.., so long as the municipality has the necessary
structure in place to ensure that the program as a whole remains accessible." 2'
According to the defendants, "[e]mergency managers cannot prevent unpre-
dictable events from happening; instead, effective emergency management cre-
ates structures and processes to ensure that temporary inaccessibility in a par-
ticular aspect of the program is just that - temporary. ,,278 But the inaccessibility
of the program as a whole was precisely the harm that the plaintiffs sought to
challenge.279 In addition, in the context of emergency response efforts-
services that must come within a brief window to be of any use at all-
"temporary" failures effectively become permanent ones. Finally, the plaintiffs'
entire case was premised on the notion that many of the circumstances the de-
fendants regarded as "unpredictable," including black-outs in high-rise build-
ings and the resulting difficulties in evacuating PWDs, were in fact entirely
predictable by people with expertise in addressing the needs of PWDs. With
more effective planning, the plaintiffs argued, many of the failures of the sys-
tem would not need to be "temporary" and haphazardly corrected on the fly;
they could be avoided altogether.8 °
273. Id. at 358 (question by Judge Furman).
274. Id.
275. Telephone Interview with Susan Dooha, supra note iio.
276. Defendants' Pre-Trial Memorandum of Law at 12, BCID, 287 F.R.D. 24o (No. ii Civ.
6690).
277. Id. at 12-13.
278. Id. at 12.
279. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 19, at 12-15.
280. See id. at 12-15, 19-20.
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Fourth, the parties disagreed about the importance of disseminating de-
tailed information about emergency plans and programs to PWDs and on the
adequacy of 311 and 911 as providers of emergency information and services. In
the defendants' view, because 311 operators were capable of connecting PWDs
to emergency services and the City consistently directed all residents in distress
to call 311 for help, PWDs could readily access the programs available to
them . 8' The plaintiffs, in contrast, emphasized the importance of conveying to
PWDs specific information about what services were available, as such infor-
mation would help PWDs access the programs they most needed and enable
them to plan more effectively during times of disaster."2 In her declaration,
named plaintiff Joyce Delarosa stated that she had called 911, 311, and the
Mayor's Office for People With Disabilities in an effort to find out "what the
emergency plans were for people who use wheelchairs."8' Neither the 911 op-
erator nor 311 operator had information about any such plans, and she "was
never able to make contact with anyone [at the Mayor's Office for People With
Disabilities]."8' Another witness for the plaintiffs testified that she was unfa-
miliar with the Homebound Evacuation Operation (HEO)-the City's sole
evacuation mechanism for PWDs- and was not aware of anyone who had suc-
cessfully been evacuated by calling 311. s8 During the plaintiffs' opening state-
ment, plaintiffs' counsel emphasized that "the City is not telling people about
this [HEO] program. This program will only respond to individualized re-
quests for assistance .... As a result.. . this program has served fewer than 300
people in the last two hurricanes combined. '', s6 Without greater transparency,
increased capacity, and a systemic rather than case-by-case approach, the plain-
tiffs argued, PWDs would not know about or know to seek out evacuation ser-
vices. Thus, the City's evacuation program could not be construed as adequate
to meet the needs of PWDs.
Fifth, the trial demonstrated the parties' vastly different perceptions of the
baseline level of accessibility faced by PWDs in non-emergency situations - and
therefore, the extent to which everyday systems could be relied upon to meet
the needs of PWDs in an emergency. A main point of contention was the City's
reliance on public transportation as a means to evacuate PWDs. An attorney for
the City pressed an expert witness for the plaintiffs whose testimony suggested
281. Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 48, 159, 190-91.
282. Class Action Complaint, supra note 19, at 12-15.
283. Declaration of Joyce Delarosa in Support of Plaintiffs para. 3, BCID, 287 F.R.D. 24o (No. 11-
Civ-669o).
z84. Id.
285. Trial Transcript at 159, BCID, 287 F.R.D. 24o (No. 11-Civ.-669o).
286. Id. at io-iu.
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that over eighty percent of the subway system was inaccessible. "[W]hat you
mean is that a certain percentage of the stations are inaccessible; that doesn't
necessarily mean that the system is inaccessible to people . . . in a wheel-
chair,"'' 7 the attorney concluded. The expert later explained that "(w]hen
you're used to navigating a system that only has very partial access, you know
those routes. But when some of those routes may no longer be usable, you can
be extremely lost in being able to navigate the system.", 88 The expert also ex-
plained that City buses, though accessible under ordinary circumstances, were
only accessible if non-disabled passengers made room for wheelchair users- a
social norm that could not be relied upon "in an emergency, when the weather
is inclement, when there's a lot of rush and stress going on, [and] that eti-
quette that you can sometimes count on degrades." ' The testimony under-
scored the risks of expecting PWDs like Kenneth Martinez and the plaintiffs'
expert to be able to evacuate using the public transportation system when the
vast majority of that system is inaccessible. "I will never probably in my
lifetime have the same access to that system that you [non-disabled people]
have,""29 the expert explained.
Finally, the parties disagreed about the significance of the new practices the
City had adopted in response to Hurricane Sandy. Wishing to be credited for
the innovative measures the City had undertaken during the post-Sandy relief
efforts and the new protocols developed along the way, the defendants rejected
what they perceived as the plaintiffs' desire to "freeze planning at some arbi-
trary date." 91 "[D]isaster planning does not and cannot stand still, " " the de-
fendants argued. "The evidence will show that disaster planning is always a
work in progress. Plans and planning are never finished."9" The plaintiffs,
however, were unimpressed by the City's innovations, many of which had been
adopted only after Hurricane Sandy. As Pinover-Kupiec explains, "[T]he de-
fendants were pointing to all of [these programs] that we thought were very
limited in scope .... We're not saying those [new initiatives] are bad, we're
saying they're not good enough.... This [case] is about the City's underlying
planning."294 In the plaintiffs' eyes, each new program only further under-
scored how ill-prepared the defendants' initial plans had been.
287. Id. at 185.
288. Id. at 250.
289. Id. at 187.
290. Id. at 251.
291. Id. at 54.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Telephone interview with Julia Pinover-Kupiec, supra note 86.
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V. THE RULING AND SETTLEMENT
Almost one year to the day after Hurricane Sandy, Judge Furman issued a
decision finding that the City of New York's emergency plans and procedures
failed to comply with the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
the Rehabilitation Act, and the New York City Human Rights Law.29 Ac-
knowledging the "Herculean task" that the City faced in planning for and re-
sponding to emergencies and disasters and the City's extensive efforts to meet
the needs of all residents in times of disaster, Judge Furman found that "the
City's plans are inadequate to ensure that people with disabilities are able to
evacuate before or during an emergency; they fail to provide sufficiently acces-
sible shelters; and they do not sufficiently inform people with disabilities of the
availability and location of accessible emergency services.,296 Though Judge
Furman found "no evidence that these failures are a result of intentional dis-
crimination by the City against people with disabilities," he emphasized that
"the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the NYCHRL seek to prevent not only
intentional discrimination against people with disabilities, but also-indeed,
primarily -discrimination that results from 'benign neglect.'
' 9 7
The decision echoed the ruling in the CALIF case in finding that the City
had "fail[ed] to provide people with disabilities meaningful access to its emer-
gency preparedness program. ",29s But the BCID ruling went much further,
specifying the precise ways in which the City had failed to provide meaningful
access to PWDs. Stressing that the City was required to provide emergency
services to disabled and non-disabled people on an equal basis, the court found
that the City had failed to provide meaningful access to PWDs with regard to
evacuation plans, shelter plans, canvassing strategies, post-disaster resource
distribution, outreach and education regarding personal emergency planning,
and communication regarding the availability of accessible emergency ser-
vices.2 99
Not content to leave the ruling at this level of generality, the decision care-
fully explored each area of lack, identifying specific needs and avenues for im-
provement. These detailed lists will provide direction to the City as it endeav-
ors to bring its program into compliance, and serve as a powerful tool for
295. Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg (BCID), 980 F. Supp. 2d 588
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
296. Id. at 597.
297. Id (citation omitted).
298. Id. at 658.
299. Id. at 658-59.
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advocates seeking reforms in other cities. With regard to emergency shelter, for
instance, the court found:
At a minimum, to provide people with disabilities meaningful access to
the City's shelter system, the City's evacuation centers must be accessi-
ble to people with disabilities; a sufficient number of shelters to ac-
commodate people with disabilities must also be accessible; and the
City must be able to identify which shelters are, in fact, accessible.3"'
The court took pains to define accessibility within the meaning of the ADA, re-
jecting the City's contention that shelters had met the mandates of the ADA
and the RA if shelter entrances could be made "usable" °1 through ad hoc modi-
fications. "[T] he City must do more than ensure that the buildings in which it
locates its shelters are physically accessible," Judge Furman wrote. "[I]t must
ensure that the services offered therein are also accessible."3 2 Plaintiffs' access
to the City's sheltering plans could be meaningful only if the City "ensure[d]
effective communication with people with disabilities"30 3 in the shelters, in-
cluding through sign language communication and Braille signage, and pro-
vided access to electricity for users of, for instance, ventilators and power
wheelchairs.30 4 The court also rejected the notion that the City could discharge
its obligation to provide accessible shelter to PWDs by maintaining special
medical needs shelters (SMNSs), finding that "the City may not limit its ac-
commodations of people with disabilities to SMNSs. Instead, those who are
able to stay in general shelters must be accommodated there."
305
With regard to evacuation, Judge Furman found that the City's plans "fail
almost entirely to address the needs of people with disabilities during an evac-
uation of a multi-story building, "13o 6 and instead "assume that people will be
able to exit their buildings unassisted and that they will evacuate using public
transit."30 7 Because these plans did not comprehend that "[p]eople with disa-
bilities may require assistance evacuating their buildings and accessible public
transportation in order to reach an evacuation center," the plans were inade-
300. Id. at 649.
301. Id. at 616 ("Because of its awareness that not all shelters and evacuation centers are accessi-
ble-that is, compliant with the ADA- the City has adopted a 'usability' standard.").
302. Id. at 650.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 65o-51.
305. Id. at 651 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130).
306. Id. at 603.
307. Id. at 643.
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quate. °8 In particular, Judge Furman faulted the City for its failure to account
for the fact that most public transportation is inaccessible to PWDs, and for its
failure to ensure that paratransit services will be available for PWDs during an
emergency.3 °9 Nor was the City's Homebound Evacuation Operation (HEO)
sufficient: although the HEO had been adequate to fulfill the requests for
evacuation assistance that the City received during Hurricanes Irene and
Sandy,310 Judge Furman concluded that the evidence had failed to establish
that the HEO program would be sufficient to meet the needs of PWDs if they
were better informed about the program: "It is difficult to know how many
more people would have requested the assistance of the HEO during Hurri-
canes Irene and Sandy if they had known that it was available, or whether the
Operation would have been able to accommodate an increase in requests."31"'
The ruling highlighted that people with disabilities are entitled to equal ac-
cess to emergency services-but nothing more.3"2 This may explain why the
court declined to adopt the plaintiffs' framework, which would have required
the City's emergency preparedness plans to meet the nine essential components
that the CALIF court had enumerated.3"3 Instead, Judge Furman hewed closely
to the City's existing framework for emergency services, finding fault only
where the program in place at the time failed to account for the needs of
PWDs. For example, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the City's
advice that all people be prepared to shelter in place for three days after an
emergency disproportionately burdened PWDs, despite evidence that PWDs
were less likely to be able to survive for such a period.
[T]he City's plans provide that, where possible, evacuation will take
place before an emergency, and that in an emergency without notice,
evacuation and life safety measures will take place as soon as possible
thereafter. The City's recommendation that people be prepared to shel-
ter in place for up to seventy-two hours is simply personal preparedness
advice . . . . Such guidance cannot in and of itself disproportionately
burden people with disabilities.3 14
308. Id.
309. Id. at 644.
310. Id. at 607-o8.
311. Id. at 608.
312. Id. at 640-41.
313. See supra Part II.B.2; text accompanying supra note ioi; supra note 125 and accompanying
text.
314. BCID, 980 F. Supp. 2d at 652.
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Likewise, the court found that "[b]ecause the City does not plan for interim
housing for anyone, the ADA does not require that it do so specifically for peo-
ple with disabilities."31 Significantly, the court applied this same comparator
group rationale in concluding that PWDs were not entitled to participate in
formulating the City's emergency plans. "Plaintiffs . . .have not alleged - let
alone demonstrated - that people with disabilities are denied an opportunity to
participate in the planning process that those without disabilities are given ....
[so] the ADA does not mandate that the City involve people with disabilities
,,316
However, within the boundaries of the equal access framework, the court
took an expansive view of the meaning of access. For instance, the court faulted
the City's plans for their failure to "call for canvassing after an emergency, to
help ensure that the services provided to people without disabilities may reach
those with disabilities who are unable to leave their buildings. '3 17 Rather than
describing post-disaster canvassing as a necessary service in its own right, the
court emphasized that canvassing efforts were needed to ensure that PWDs
would receive the same services as non-disabled people.318 But post-disaster
canvassing for PWDs who remain trapped in their apartments is most effective
where it is implemented immediately, with the aim of reaching people before
they become desperate for food, water, and medical services. For PWDs with
accessible transportation and sheltering options, canvassing and evacuation as-
sistance might be the only emergency service required, not a means of connect-
ing to additional services. In light of this, the court might have construed can-
vassing and individualized high-rise evacuation as separate services -ones not
required by or provided to able-bodied individuals, and therefore services that
could, on an equal basis, be denied to PWDs. Instead, the court took a broad
view of emergency services, recognizing that the emergency program would
exclude PWDs absent reasonable modifications to meet their unique needs.3 19
All in all, the decision represented a searing indictment of the City's treat-
ment of PWDs during disasters. "[E]ven if. . . people with disabilities are in-
cluded in the City's planning process," Judge Furman wrote, "such inclusion
does not remedy the failure of the emergency plans themselves to adequately
31S. Id. at 654.
316. Id. at 656-57.
317-. Id. at 652.
318. Id. (finding that "[t]hose unable to leave their buildings are obviously unable to access the
City's emergency services, such as sheltering, food and water distribution, and the provision
of medical services").
319. Id. at 658-59. See also Alexander, 469 U.S. at 301 (holding that a "benefit itself, of course,
cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individu-
als the meaningful access to which they are entitled").
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accommodate people with special needs."320 Mere tokenism would not satisfy
the ADA; the City could not put off the concerns of PWDs by pointing to the
occasional involvement in planning of a person with a disability. Instead, the
plans would have to stand or fall on their own terms - terms that the plaintiffs,
Disability Rights Advocates, and the BCID ruling helped to forever redefine.
Having found that the City violated the ADA, RA, and NYCHRL, the court di-
rected the parties to discuss potential remedies for the violations, noting that a
remedy would be better accomplished by those with expertise in such matters
than by court order.
3 21
Over the course of the next year, the parties worked to reach a settlement
that would address the many inadequacies identified by the court, and the par-
ties submitted a joint stipulation of settlement to the court in September 2014.
The settlement includes seven separate Memoranda of Understanding
(MOUs), which address the City's plans for emergency communications, high-
rise evacuation, accessible transportation, sheltering, power outages, and can-
vassing." The memoranda also require the City to create a high-level position
within the Office of Emergency Management to address the specific needs of
PWDs,33 as well as a Disability Advisory Community Panel to provide contin-
uous feedback on the City's emergency plans for PWDs.3 4
Taken together, these memoranda create a comprehensive plan that aims to
fully integrate the needs of PWDs into all of the City's critical emergency func-
tions, while reserving a significant role for the plaintiffs in crafting and imple-
menting the City's plans. For example, the MOU for high-rise evacuation re-
quires the Fire Department to convene and coordinate a task force to develop a
plan for high-rise evacuation over the course of the next year.3" The task force
will include stakeholders from relevant City agencies, as well as outsiders -
including one chosen by the plaintiffs-with expertise in the needs of PWDs in
emergency preparedness and response.26 The MOU requires that the City's 311
320. Id. at 657.
321. Id. at 659-60.
322. Stipulation of Settlement and Remedial Order, BCID, 98o F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
15, 2014) (No. 11-Civ.-o669o).
323. Id. at Exhibit F, at i (describing the City's hiring of a Disability Access and Functional Needs
Coordinator "who will work at OEM... and will report to a high ranking City official").
324. Id. at Exhibit F, at 4 (describing the duties of the Disability Community Advisory Panel,
which will meet on a quarterly basis to "address emerging issues, challenges, and solutions
related to disability and other access and functional needs in emergency planning").
325. Id. at Exhibit G, at I.
326. Id. at Exhibit G, at 1-2 (describing members of the internal core planning group, including a
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program -recently updated to allow users to use natural language to get con-
nected to the resources and information they seek-will be coded to "allow a
customer to speak 'disability evacuation' or 'homebound evacuation operation,'
or any other combination of designated words ... [in order to] be routed to a
pool of dedicated specialists (who have training with respect to working with
people with disabilities and evacuation protocols)."327 The MOU also describes
the City's intent to increase the capabilities of the 311 system to be able to han-
dle additional callers in the event of an emergency. 8 Once these changes are in
place, PWDs seeking assistance will not have to call 311 for hours on end, only
to be connected to people with no knowledge of evacuation and other forms of
assistance unique to PVVDs. Instead, callers will be able to use their own words
to be routed to people specially trained to help meet their needs.
The settlement also requires the City to create a Post-Emergency Canvass-
ing Operation plan, which "will detail the specific operational steps to be taken
by the City agencies in the event of an emergency. " " This will end the City's
practice of delegating responsibilities to agencies like the FDNY and NYPD
with no real apparatus for direction or oversight. Instead, the City will estab-
lish a new task force charged with creating a robust canvassing plan and recon-
vening during emergencies to implement it.330 Importantly, members of this
task force will be required to receive training in disability literacy, as will City
staffers designated to provide on-the-ground tactical management during fu-
ture emergencies.33 The MOU also details tools that must be provided to can-
vassing teams sent to impacted neighborhoods, explains that data collected by
canvassers must be organized in a central database for the purpose of making
referrals, and specifies that the information collected must include disability
data.32 Together, these provisions will help ensure that future post-disaster
canvassing efforts will not be "haphazard and belated, 33 3 but carefully planned
and coordinated.
The settlement establishes similar benchmarks for the City's transportation
and sheltering systems. The plans require the City to create an inventory of
City-owned vehicles with accessible features that may be available for use dur-
ing an emergency, and to conduct a needs analysis that will estimate future
327. Id. at Exhibit G, at 6.
328. Id.
329. Id. at Exhibit B, at 2.
330. See id. at Exhibit B, at 2-3.
331. Id. at Exhibit B, at 3.
332. Id. at Exhibit B, at 3-4.
333. BCID, 980 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
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demand for such vehicles.334 The MOU also requires that the City work closely
with a variety of other agencies, including the Metropolitan Transit Authority
and New York City Housing Authority, to develop transportation and evacua-
tion plans that address the needs of PVDs. 3 ' The MOU stipulates: "As with
all of the City's emergency plans, the planning documents will define roles and
responsibilities and include strategies for decision-making and criteria for im-
plementation, including identifying areas of high need .... 336 The parties'
agreement also seeks to ensure that PWDs will be made aware of their options,
committing the City to providing "clear and accurate messaging to the disabil-
ity community about accessible transportation options available during pre-
storm or forewarned evacuations, and how and where to access them."337 Simi-
larly, the agreement requires that the City conduct a needs analysis to deter-
mine the number of City shelters that are currently accessible to PWDs and to
estimate the number of facilities that will need to be added to meet the level of
demand likely to arise in a future emergency. 338 By 2017, the City will be re-
quired to identify or create a minimum of sixty accessible facilities capable of
sheltering up to 120,000 PW-Ds. 33 9 Importantly, the City must publicly dissem-
inate information about the location of accessible shelters and keep clear inter-
nal records of the accessible features at each facility for the purpose of answer-
ing questions from members of the public.340 No longer will PWDs be forced
to choose between being stranded at home and evacuating to a shelter where
basic services may be lacking. If the City meets the obligations of the settle-
ment, PWDs will be able to make informed decisions and evacuate to emergen-
cy shelters ready to meet their needs.
In the months after the parties submitted the proposed settlement to the
court, members of the class had an opportunity to submit written objec-
tions34' - but not one did. Sid Wolinsky of DRA explains that the absence of
formal objections "is rare. Given the size of the class, which numbers in the
hundreds of thousands, and the complexity and reach of the remedy-it does
334. Stipulation of Settlement and Remedial Order, supra note 322, Exhibit C, at 1-2.
335. Id. at 3-4.
336. Id. at 5.
337. Id. at 3.
338. Stipulation of Settlement and Remedial Order, supra note 318, Exhibit A, at 4.
339. Id.
34o. Id. at 6.
341. See Notice of Settlement of Class Action Lawsuit, Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the
Disabled v. Bloomberg (BCID), 980 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2014) (No. i1-CV-
669o-JMF); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5).
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speak a lot that.., not a single objection [was] filed."" 2 But the settlement had
one final hurdle to clear: Judge Furman. Rule 23 provides that a class action
lawsuit may be settled only if the court approves the settlement as fair, reason-
able, and adequate4.3 3 This form of judicial review of a settlement is a unique
feature of class action lawsuits, one that is designed to protect the interests of
the class and "is particularly important in injunctive relief litigation brought on
behalf of marginalized populations, [where the class members] might find the
notion of participating in federal litigation particularly hard to grasp. "344
At the fairness hearing in February 2015, Judge Furman declined to approve
the settlement. 34' Underscoring that the "rest of the settlement is both impres-
sive and important,"' 6 Judge Furman expressed concerns about the memoran-
dum of understanding that addressed high-rise evacuation, as that MOU alone
established a process by which the City would develop a high-rise evacuation
plan, rather than detailing the required elements of the plan itself."7 Since the
MOU required only that the City engage in a process of developing recom-
mendations, Judge Furman noted, it was unclear if the court possessed the
power to order any remedy other than further process 4s -even though order-
ing more of the same defective process would be unlikely to yield different re-
sults. Questioning whether the MOU adequately addressed the liability issues
identified in the court's ruling, Judge Furman expressed his concern that defer-
ring the details of the plan to a later date was tantamount to "kicking the can
down the road."349 Sid Wolinsky of DRA explained that the parties needed
time to develop a high-rise evacuation plan because "there is no city in America
that has a satisfactory high-rise evacuation plan for people with disabilities," so
DRA did not have a model plan at the ready.350 It was for this reason, said
Wolinsky, that the settlement extended the court's jurisdiction over this issue
342. Wolinsky Interview No. i, supra note 103.
343. FED. R. CW. P. 23(2).
344. Email from David W. Marcus, Professor of Law, Univ. of Ariz. James E. Rogers Coll. of
Law, to author (Mar. 3, 2015). Marcus is the author of numerous articles on class action law-
suits, including The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015),
http ://ssrn.com/abstract=2565988 [http://perma.cc/CU9F-EU7G]
345. Transcript of Fairness Hearing, Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloom-
berg (BCID), 980 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2015) (No. 11-CV-669o-JMF).
346. Id. at 19.
347. Id. at 3.
348. Id. at 14-17 (expressing concern that, per the MOU, "if [the] full extent of [the judge's] au-
thority under the terms of the settlement is [ ] to order the task force to continue its delibera-
tions ad infinitum that is not really a remedy of the liability findings").
349. Id. at 3.
350. Id. at 4.
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to 2018.'' But Judge Furman was not satisfied, and he adjourned the hearing
without approving the settlement."2
The parties may well have been surprised by Judge Furman's reluctance to
approve the settlement; in October 2014, Judge Furman had granted the plain-
tiffs' request to enter the MOUs between the parties as an order subject to
modification after a fairness hearing,"3 finding that "[t]he seven MOUs lay out
in detail concrete steps that Defendants will take in planning for, and respond-
ing to, emergencies and disasters to better accommodate [PWDs]." Months
later and just four days before the fairness hearing, Judge Furman requested
that the parties be prepared to address the adequacy of the high-rise evacuation
MOU,355 making its lack of specificity a focal point of that hearing and with-
holding approval of the settlement pending further briefing on the matter.36
Judge Furman requested that the parties address the extent of the court's au-
thority "to craft and impose its own remedies" if the task force failed to develop
recommendations as required by the MOU. s7 Perhaps signaling the extent of
his concern with the MOU, Judge Furman also requested that the parties dis-
cuss "[w]hether the Court has the authority under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23 to approve only part of the Settlement Agreement or whether the Set-
tlement Agreement must stand or fall as a whole." s8 In asking these questions,
Judge Furman may well have worried that the promise of a plan without more
specific requirements about its content would be an empty victory, as had been
the case for the disabled children who sued their school to ensure their needs
would be met in an emergency, only to be left behind pursuant to the resulting
plan.319 "[T]hese are important issues and [it's] better to get them right than to
get it done prematurely," Judge Furman concluded.3
6
,
In their letters to the court, the parties disagreed about the appropriate
course of action in the event of the City's failure to meet the requirements of
351. Id. at 5-6.
352. Id. at 19-20.
353. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled v.
Bloomberg (BCID), No. 11-CV-669o-JMF (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2014) (pertaining to proce-
dures for class notice and fairness hearing process).
354. Id. at 3.
355. Order, BCID, No. 11-CV-669o (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2015).
356. Transcript of Fairness Hearing, supra note 146, at 3-4.
357. Order, BCID, No. 11-CV-669o (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2015).
358. Id.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 75-82 (discussing Shirey ex rel. Kyger v. City of Alexan-
dria Sch. Bd., 229 F. 3 d 1143, 2000 WL 1198054 (4 th Cir. 2000) (unpublished)).
360. Transcript of Fairness Hearing supra note 345, at 20..
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the high-rise evacuation MOU. The plaintiffs emphasized the Court's broad
equitable powers upon a motion for enforcement or contempt, underscoring
that the court would be empowered to "tak[e] 'any reasonable action' to secure
compliance, including imposing its own remedial measures." 6' In contrast,
though the defendants acknowledged the court's "broad authority to issue an
injunction to remedy the violations identified in [its] opinion, "362 the defend-
ants urged that the court "refrain from adding to or modifying the terms of the
Settlement Agreement itself' ' 63 in the event of a default, and instead do no
more than "direct the Task Force to take further action in order to achieve the
requirements that are set forth in the Settlement Agreement."36' Despite this
critical difference, the parties agreed on one issue: in their view, the court
lacked the power to approve the settlement in part. Judge Furman would need
to approve the settlement in its entirety or not at all.
6
,
When the parties returned to court in March 2015, Judge Furman made it a
point to clarify that in the event of a default, the court would be empowered
not only to enforce the remedial contractual terms agreed upon by the parties -
in particular, development of recommendations by the high-rise evacuation
taskforce- but, if necessary, to issue an injunction to impose alternate means of
remedying the violations identified in the court's opinion.366 Leaving nothing
to chance, Judge Furman asked the parties to confirm on the record that the
court would have the authority (1) to craft its own remedies "if I ultimately de-
termine that [ordering the task force to develop recommendations] is not effec-
tive or futile";367 (2) to evaluate and decide whether the recommendations de-
veloped by the task force adequately "address the existing gaps in New York
City's highrise building evacuation plans" that had been identified by the
court, and to order the promulgation of new recommendations or craft other
remedies if not;, 68 and, finally, (3) to direct the City to implement any recom-
mendations that the court found to be "reasonable and achievable," if the City
361. Plaintiffs' Letter Pursuant to Court's February 13, 2015 Order at 2, BCID, No. 1-CV-669o
(JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2015) (quoting Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1568 (2d Cir.
1985) (quoting Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1271 (5 th Cir. 198o))).
362. Defendants' Letter Pursuant to Court's February 13, 2015 Order at 2, BCID, No. 11-CV-669o
(JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2015).
363. Id. (citing Perez v. Danbury Hosp., 347 F.3d 419, 424 (2d Cit. 2003); Berger, 771 F.2d at
1568).
364. Id.
365. Id. at 3; Plaintiffs' Letter, supra note 361, at 1-2.
366. Transcript of Fairness Hearing at 3-6, BCID, No. 11-CV-669o (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6,
2015).
367. Id. at 5.
368. Id. at 5-6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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had refused to do SO. 36 9 After the parties affirmed the court's understanding of
the nature and extent of its authority, Judge Furman was ready to approve the
settlement. "The fact that we needed to delay the liability trial in this very case
because of Hurricane Sandy makes it starkly clear that an emergency can occur
at any time," Judge Furman stated, and the plaintiffs would not be well-served
by further delay.370 Noting his ongoing concerns about the high-rise evacua-
tion MOU but concluding that the complexity and novelty of the issue pre-
cluded speedy resolution,371 Judge Furman approved the settlement in its en-
tirety.7 2 "I promise you that I will closely monitor the progress of the task force
and the implementation of any recommendations," 3 Judge Furman stated.
But "my reservations ... notwithstanding, . . . the settlement is 'nothing short
of remarkable.' 374 "I have little doubt that this settlement will serve as a model
for municipalities nationwide, and, frankly, that all Americans, not just those
with disabilities, will be the better for it."37
CONCLUSION: RAISING UP THE RIGHT TO BE RESCUED: THE
SIGNIFICANCE AND PROMISE OF BCID
Disasters are becoming more and more frequent. As our society confronts
more emergencies that test the limits of our capabilities, tough decisions will lie
ahead. Although popular media accounts sometimes insist that "[a] tenet of
natural disasters is that they choose their victims capriciously and without re-
morse,"376 the truth is far more disturbing-we choose our victims by failing to
accommodate their needs. BCID v. Bloomberg, like the disability rights statutes
upon which it is based, serves as a reminder that we cannot settle for what is
good enough for most of us if doing so leaves some of us behind. Challenging
ourselves to remember that all members of society should have access to oppor-
369. Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
370. Id. at 13.
371. Id. at 14-15.
372. Id. at 19. See also Order Granting Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement,
Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg (BCID), No. ll-CV-669o-
JMF (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2015).
373. Transcript of Fairness Hearing, supra note 366, at 14.
374. Id. at 15 (quoting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement at 2,
BCID, No. 11-CV-669o-JMF (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2015)).
375. Id. at 18-19.
376. N.R. Kleinfield, Brave, Foolhardy, and Just Unlucky: The Lives Lost in a Storm's Watery Fury,
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tunities regardless of the impairments we may face may be the most difficult in
moments of crisis; it is also no less important then.
BCID is the second ruling to find a right to be rescued under the ADA and
the RA: the right of PWDs to equally access any emergency services provided
to non-disabled individuals. As Sid Wolinsky of DRA explains, BCID "builds
on the CALIF case, but... is of far greater significance now than the California
case," " in part because the BCID ruling resulted from a full trial on the mer-
its. This "brought out a lot more material and a lot more detail .... [A] fter a
judge has had the opportunity to review that sort of record, the decision ends
up with more weight." 3,8 The BCID ruling and the parties' negotiated settle-
ment agreement are the first to set forth detailed, comprehensive explanations
of the manner in which emergency plans must be modified to meet the ADA's
and the RA's requirement of "meaningful access" for PWDs, and the plans re-
sulting from the settlement "are the most comprehensive disability disaster
plans that now exist in the country."3 79 As such, the BCID ruling and settle-
ment agreement provide powerful tools for disability rights groups seeking to
spur negotiations or file lawsuits to secure the right to be rescued in other ju-
risdictions. DRA has begun distributing checklists to community groups across
the country that describe how to identify and address deficiencies in emergency
plans for PWDs,380 and just as the CALIF case served as a model and inspira-
tion for the BCID ruling, now both cases will help fuel the momentum for fur-
ther reform. Indeed, in the fall of 2014, a coalition of disability rights advocates
filed a legal challenge to the adequacy of Washington, D.C.'s emergency
plans, 38' and as of this writing, the parties have agreed to pursue a comprehen-
sive settlement of the dispute.382
Although the intervention of Hurricane Sandy at a critical juncture makes
the story behind this case unusually dramatic, the legal arguments put forward
in BCID are easily replicable. The crux of the plaintiffs' argument was not the
stories of suffering post-Sandy; instead, the plaintiffs successfully argued that
the City's failure to provide an adequate emergency plan that expressly includ-
ed PWDs was the harm. Because of this, advocates for people with disabilities




381. Press Release, Disability Rights Advocates, District of Columbia Sued for Failure To
Serve People with Disabilities During Disasters (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.dralegal
.org/pressroom/press-releases/district-of-columbia-sued-for-failure-to-serve-people-with
-disabilities [http://perma.cc/C82H-A2XG].
382. United Spinal Ass'n v. District of Columbia, No. 1:1 4 -cv-o1528-CKK (D.D.C. filed Sept. 9,
2014).
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need little more than a bad emergency plan to begin working toward a better
one; they need not, and should not, wait for the next disaster to strike before
making these moves. By the same token, local governments should heed the
lessons of these cases and foster genuine partnerships with PWDs to address
shortfalls in disaster planning before further lawsuits arise. After all, says Susan
Dooha of CIDNY, advocates now "know that if they cannot persuade people [,]
... they too can go to court[] and.., won't have to wait as long as we did. '', 8,
Dooha hopes that "by letting people know about the decision in New York...
we will be able to accelerate the process of inclusion in other jurisdictions...
,,384
The story of the BCID case illustrates several important principles that
must guide emergency planning for PWDs. First, there must be detailed plans
that anticipate the needs of PVDs and outline clear strategies for meeting
those needs. Where hundreds of thousands of people are at risk and a disaster
has further compromised the already-limited transportation, communication,
and sheltering options available to PWDs, on-the-fly solutions are almost cer-
tain to fail. In BCID, for instance, the court noted that the City's canvassing ef-
forts to identify people who needed assistance in the days after Sandy were not
undertaken pursuant to any plan, and "although the City was able to marshal
substantial resources and reach a large number of people, its efforts were hap-
hazard and belated."' 8' Even if successful, improvised efforts are not a guaran-
tee of future success; absent any written guidance, "there is no way to know
whether or how the City will attempt to make inaccessible [programs] usable
for people with disabilities in the future.", 86 Echoing a point that Disability
Rights Advocates, the National Council on Disability, 8' and countless other
disability rights organizations have emphasized for years, the court held that
"the needs of people with disabilities... [can] only be accommodated through
advance planning." s8 8 Significantly, the court found that "ad hoc accommoda-
tions 'are both legally inadequate and practically unrealistic.'-, 89
383. Telephone Interview with Susan Dooha, supra note i1o.
384. Id.
385. Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of Disabled v. Bloomberg (BCID), 98o F. Supp. 2d 588, 626
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
386. Id. at 617 (commenting on the accessibility of evacuation centers and shelters).
387. See generally Effective Emergency Management: Making Improvements for Communities
and People with Disabilities, NAT'L COUNCIL ON DIsABILITY (Aug. 12, 2009), http://
www.ncd.gov/rawmedia-repository/5ob76caf 054c_491d ae88_587co96d8b3a?document
.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZM85-CTLY] (summarizing best practices).
388. BCID, 980 F. Supp. 2d at 644.
389. Id. (citing Cmtys. Actively Living Indep. & Free v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 09-0287
CBM RZX, 2011 WL 4595993, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Feb. io, 2011)).
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Second, cities must provide effective, detailed communication with people
with disabilities before, during, and after emergency events. As the BCID rul-
ing explained, "[p]ersonal preparedness is indisputably an important compo-
nent of emergency planning,"390 but "[w] ithout any information on accessible
evacuation centers or transportation, people with disabilities cannot make [an
adequate emergency] plan."39" ' During Hurricane Sandy, the City failed to pro-
vide sufficient information to PWDs3 92 and even gave incorrect information to
PWDs in a manner likely to discourage them from making use of emergency
services.393 Incomplete or inaccurate information was not merely bad practice;
the ruling emphasized that "[t]he ADA prohibits the provision of such an une-
qual opportunity to plan."
394
Third, cities should enlist outside experts to assist with modifications to
emergency plans. Although doing so requires both institutional humility and
added expense, the alternative is to rely on the very professionals and agency
insiders whose decisions have long disregarded the needs of PWDs. Admitting
that emergency plans may need a fresh set of eyes need not suggest that any
past discrimination was intentional; instead, it is an acknowledgment of the
challenging nature of planning for PWDs in times of extraordinary crisis. Both
the BCID and CALIF courts required the defendants to enlist outside experts,
and it is likely that future courts faced with such cases will do the same.
Fourth, PWDs must be allowed to meaningfully participate in emergency
planning processes. As Paul Timmons of Portlight Strategies3 9 explains,
"There's a saying within the movement, nothing about us without us. Within
the emergency management rubric, almost everything about us has been with-
out us... [and] therein lies the problem. '', 96 In BCID, the court found that be-
cause non-disabled people had no right to participate in emergency planning,
"the ADA does not mandate that the City involve people with disabilities in the
formulation of its emergency preparedness program [either]; instead, it re-
390. Id. at 630.
391. Id. at 655.
392. See id. at 655-56 (describing the shortcomings of the City's communication of emergency
information).
393. Id. at 621 ("Although the record indicates that at least some of the supplies required by peo-
ple with disabilities are available at -or can, if needed, be procured by- the City's shelters,
the City warns otherwise in its communications with the public.... These warnings are
likely to discourage people with disabilities from evacuating to a shelter in the first in-
stance.").
394. Id. at 655.
395. See supra note iii for a description of Portlight Strategies.
396. Telephone Interview with Paul Timmons, Bd. Chair, Portlight Strategies (Sept. 26, 2014).
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quires only that they have meaningful access to that program.""97 While the
law may not require cities to involve PWDs in emergency planning- and this is
a point that is likely to continue to be debated in subsequent cases-such in-
volvement can help to foster more positive collaboration between city agencies
and the disability rights organizations and individuals the city must serve. Be-
cause centers for independent living (CILs)-cross-disability, community-
based entities that serve PWDs and exist in every state' 9s - are required by the
Rehabilitation Act to be designed, operated, and majority-governed by
PVTDs,3 99 partnering with such entities will enable government agencies to col-
laborate4°0 with individuals whose expertise in disability justice stems both
from experience as service providers,40' and from lived experience as PWDs.
The failures that the City of New York described as "unforeseeable" in the af-
termath of Sandy were entirely foreseeable to, and feared by, the disability
community; indeed, those anticipated failures were the impetus of the lawsuit
itself. Leveraging years of experience and community building among PWDs,
disability rights groups can help make sure that emergency plans are compre-
hensive and practical and that PVDs can connect to the resources they need. At
the same time, such partnerships between government agencies and CILs can
bring to bear the significant governmental resources necessary to notify and
meet the needs of PWDs in crisis -resources that few CILs may possess on
their own. 402
397. BCID, 980 F. Supp. 2d at 656-57.
398. ILRU Directory of Centers for Independent Living (CILs) and Associations - 2014 (Vol.
36), INDEP. LrVING REs. UTILIZATION, http://www.ilru.org/projects/cil-net/cil-center-and
-association-directory [http://perma.cc/EDF6-UEND].
399. 29 U.S.C. § 7 9 6(f)(4 )(c)(2) (2012) (centers for independent living must be "designed and
operated within local communities by individuals with disabilities," PWDs must comprise a
majority of board members, and boards must be the "principal governing body of the cen-
ter"). Both the Brooklyn Center for the Independence of the Disabled and the Center for the
Independence of the Disabled, New York are CILs. See supra notes 1O9 and 130.
400. Telephone Interview with Paul Timmons, supra note 396.
401. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DIsABiLiTY, supra note 387, at 250 ("Disability organizations not only
advocate for the needs of people with disabilities, they are also experts at providing ser-
vices.").
402. See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 248 (witness for the plaintiffs stating the neces-
sity of having "a very clear understanding of what these community-based organizations
[serving PWDs] can and cannot do" and noting that "there were a lot of assumptions in the
Advanced Warning System plan" about the capacity of such organizations to contact PWDs
in the event of an emergency); id. at 294-296 (witness for the City confirming that as of that
date, organizations that had signed up to perform the AWS functions did not receive fund-
ing from the City to do so, and OEM had not formally assessed the capacity of these organi-
zations to notify clients).
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The story of BCID teaches one final lesson: we should not rely on lawsuits
to motivate us to do what is right. To be sure, BCID is a powerful example of
how class action lawsuits can serve as tools to enable marginalized people to be
involved in the processes most affecting their lives; absent this case, it is doubt-
ful that the City would have ever collaborated with the plaintiffs to bring about
meaningful programmatic reforms. At the same time, the case demonstrates
how all too often, litigation serves to drive home lessons a willing listener could
have learned long ago. For years, members of the Office of Emergency Man-
agement's Special Needs Advisory Group, including several of the BCID plain-
tiffs, had warned the City that people with mobility and other disabilities could
not self-evacuate from high-rise buildings if elevators were out of service; that
many public schools, which were used as emergency shelters, were inaccessible
to PWDs; and that the public transportation system could not evaluate PWDs
en masse, since it was largely inaccessible to PWDs.4 °3 City officials did not lis-
ten; it took a class action lawsuit to make it do so. Had it engaged in serious
negotiations with the plaintiffs earlier on and shown greater deference to their
expertise on the needs of PWDs, the litigation could have been avoided and the
parties could have gotten down to the business of crafting solutions much
sooner.
The task of listening to marginalized people is not that of city agencies or
federal judges alone - court orders cannot take the place of our own conscienc-
es. We must all continue to combat prejudice against people with disabilities
outside of the courtroom, taking responsibility for meeting everyone's needs in
times of disaster and in those of lesser crisis. While the law may serve to con-
cretize and remind us of our obligations to each other, in the end, it is up to us
to ensure that no one is left behind when the next storms come.
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